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ABSTRACT
This research looks at the tradition of
centralizm in France and its implications on city design.
The geographic and administrative centralization
of France is a process due to a set of random events
and deliberate choices. The very special relationship
which was built tfoughout this process between the
central governments of France and Paris was dramatically
expressed in the design of Paris. Chapters I and II
look at the history of this centralization, the evolution
of Paris design and discusses the formation of a design
model of urban center.
Chapter III and IV show how this model was adapted
to the modern urban scale, at first in the French
colonies and then in the Paris region.
A parallel intent of this thesis is to discuss
the meaning and the implications-of designing centers as
opposed to environments with centrality. Chapter V
elaborate on this theme and document it through the
Paris'region newtowns experience.
Chapter VI is a final discussion of the information
and the concepts presented in this study.
Thesis supervisor: Julian Beinart
Title: Professor of Architecture
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CHAPTER I
A BACKGROUND TO THE PLANNING OF FRANCE AND PARIS.
Introduction.
It is probably a rather banal observation to say that France is, for a long
time, a country with a tradition of highly centralized administration. I am not
sure, however, that the foreign observer can measures how much the central
administration really impacts on everything that is planned, developed or
restructured in France. I would think that it is really hard for a foreigner to
imagine how much the central administration decides and structures the future of
France and the daily life of its citizen.
Indeed, the goal of this section is not only to provide the reader with the
information that would help him to situate and app'eciate the current trends of
the policy of urban planning in France but also to give him a sense of this
particular system.
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At first,it is important to understand that if the centralization of France does
not constitute a very remarkable event at the world scale its political and
administrative organization differentiate it from the rest of the western european
democracies. In effect, France has had a strong central government for a long
time which is not the case of its neighbors. For instance, Germany as we know it
today is rather new. Until recently, Germany was a collection of sovereign and
independent states that eventually federated.
Therefore the first question to answer is to understand the forces that
historically made possible the centralization of France.
I Urban Planification in France.
1.1 The political process of centralization in France.
The rise of Paris dominance over the rest of France can be explained, I
believe, by the fact that French nobility never assumed (or even attempted to )
the administration of its territory. Instead, far from playing a responsible and
positive role in fostering local development the French nobles contributed to the
decline of their regions. They were uniquely interested by themselves and in
selected aristocratic matters. Their economic basis being provided through the
system of servage that entitled them to take automatically possession of a large
part of the peasants crops the nobles had, in effect, no incentive to think to
down to earth matters such as to organise the economy of their region. In fact,
they were more a plight than anything else : One of their main occupation was to
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battle between each other, thus destroying the crops of the peasants depending
on their enemy. Not to speak of the expeditions of the wandering knights or the
tribute that the peasants had to pay in goods and men for the crusades.
At the opposit of the nobility, the merchant class had to find a way to construct
an environment, secure enough to protect its industrious activities. Since the
bourgeois were rich enough, they proceeded to buy their independance from the
nobility. The system was the one of the "Chartes", a legal document, a contract
beetween the bourgeois patrons of a town and the nobility, that gave to the
former the right to administrate their own city . These Chartes were quite
specific and had to be often amended to match new developments of the
commercial activities. A constant and crucial term of the Chartes, however, was
that any men placed under the protection of the patrons of the cities would
become a citizen, that is a freeman. The citizen status obviously attracted the
peasant-serfs and was instrumental in concentrating population and wealth in the
cities. It is in this framework that the bourgeoisy prospered enough to ultimately
become the strong political and financial force that, in alliance with the Monarchy
successfully undermined the Feudal order.
Before embarking in this determinant political shift the bourgeoisy had already
affected the cities in three ways: 1- The bourgeois contributed to transform the
socio-professionnal structures ( specifically in the construction sector - a fact that
trigerred important changes in the way buildings were to be constructed).2- The
guildes were developing new facilities for the city.3- The rich merchant introduced
a new componant to the fabric of the city: the urban palace.. The palace was a
reflection of the bourgeois as much as the castle and the cathedral had been for
the nobility and the clergy. If the castle was austere and isolated for military
reasons, the palace of the bourgeois was confortable, provided with modern
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facilities and integrated in the city. For instance, the palais of Jacques Coeur, a
merchant of international importance, was equipped with sanitary facilities that
were inexistant, later, in the Palais de Versailles.
The interest of the bourgeois in improving and modernising was not limited
to its own habitat and lead him to consider the city globally. It is thus logic for
the bourgeois to control the corporations of the building sector. The fifteenth
century will be a strategic moment in the history of construction : In this period
of crisis of the Feudal structure, the organization of construction jobs will be
marked by a determinant evolution. At the end of the 100 years war the
organization of work is determined, unified and reinforced. The method of
penetration of the corporations (quite similarly to what happened with the chartes)
consisted in purchasing the position of principal master of a specific craft. This
had been made possible by purchasing from the King the " Lettre de Maitrise "
during the Sixteen but specially during the fifteen century. king. This was a
dramatic change to the way to access to the position of master for which the
postulant had, traditionally, to pass through a series of steps and competitions
showing its exceptionnal skills in the craft.
The arrival of the affairist bourgeois at the head of the corporations
introduced the division of work within the corporations between the
entrepreneur-bourgeois who manages to get the commission, the material and the
capital for the entreprise and supervise the work and the crafstmen being simple
executant-workers. The influence of the bourgeois-entrepreneur and the
bourgeois-client changed the methods of construction(from wood to stone) as
well as the nature of domestic construction and by and large the nature of the
city fabric. The emergence of the principal master will introduce an element of
rupture in the collective produstion of the Middle Ages and the city fabric will
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ultimately shift from the Medieval continuum to the discontinuity and the
hierarchy of urban spaces of the classical town.
The changes in the urban fabric proceeded from the transformation of the social
structure during the fiteen and sixteen century. In Feudal society personal power
is represented by a high rank in the social hierarchy or a religious title. The
monarchy and the aristocracy will maintain their social status at the cultural level.
The laicization of knowledge takes here all its sense. Knowledge will no longer be
the prerogative of the religious order; it will be integrated by the new class in
power which will make it its own prerogative. French Renaissance will express
the cultural brilliance of the King and its court. In this context, the edifice
acquires a cultural power. The institution of the state backed by the rising
bourgeoisy is developed together with the codification of space. This code is
based on an order of human thinking that equalizes knowledge of the world and
action toward the world and gives to the perception and the intervention on space
a structure of thought traductible through the means of central pespective. E.
Panofsky has wrote of the symbolic form of the central perspective and shown
its use by the architect humanist of the Renaissance.
The intellectualization of the process of conception of the buildings form will
lead to the emergence of a new specialist, the achitect who will introduce the
transformations in the city.
We have just see how the bourgeoisy incrementally built its power. At first
the bourgeois bought their freedom then proceeded to control sectors other than
the trade to reorganise the urban society at their image. Logically a point arrived
where the Feudal system was an obstacle to the further expansion of the
activities of the bourgeoisy and where the latter was strong enough to act against
the former. This was the time of the historical alliance between the bourgeoisy
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and the monarchy that led to the installation of the supreme monarchy in place of
the feudalism.
This, in turn, implied the concentration of the administration around the king
and marked the end for the possibility of an autonomous development of the
region. All the societal developments thet the bourgeoisy had introduced at the
city scale (the division of labor, the specialisation, the rationalization of the
city,etc.) were transfered at the scale of the state which was to be ruled by the
powers concentrated in the royal administration. This was the stating point of
the concentration of France over Paris which Napoleon I, the Revolution and the 11
Empire further emphasized. Of course, several towns with well organised
bourgeoisy continued to expand as already well as important towns such a Lyon
or Marseilles. It is true to say , however, that the gap between Paris and the rest
of France began to really increase at this point.
1-2 The genesis of centralism - a gradual process.
However, this centralization over Paris did not reach a critical stage at
once. In the 16 century the court stayed in the departments of the Seine and
the Loire. Paris is only the biggest town of France. In 1789, Paris had become
France itself. The moral separation between Paris and the provinces starts with
the concentration of the intellectual world in Paris. The Parisian snobism is an
object of amusement for Corneille in the play ' Les Precieuses Ridicules ' in 1689
but no more than fiteen years later the derogatory expression 'La Province'
appears. During this epoch everyone that 'counts' is grouped around the King sun,
whereas the rest of the nation is conscious of its inferiority.. Tocqueville remarks
that the important printers that existed in the Provinces in the 16 and the begining
of the 17 century have all disappeared, although a greater quantity of books is
published during 18 than during the 17 century.
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However, under Louis 14 there is an attempt to plan urban development in the
regions. Even thought the king as an agent in each department, this agent,
l'intendant has a fair amount of leeway from the central governement and is thus
able to adapt himself to the specificity of the local populations and their
customs. Thus under Louis XIV, 40,000 kilometers of road are constructed all over
France that still constitute, today, the basic structure of the French road network.
The main towns of Province begin to play the role of regional capitales thanks to
redevelopment schemes of great urbanists such as Turgot in Limoges . The
Intendant of the king suggest rather than he orders. The province have a relative
autonomy in their management. The region of Languedoc,for instance, collects its
own taxes. The Encyclopedists are in favor of the decentralization. In short, this
is the 'Golden Age' of the Administration.
In 1793, the Convention named a small body to take care of the territorial
organization of the republic. This committee had three basic ideas: One was to
destroy the despotism of the Intendant du Roi, the second was to create
administrative divisions that would be functionnal and adapted to the means of
communication, the third idea was a fear of Paris' preponderance.
The first idea resulted in the creation of a departemental assembly that worked
with difficulty for three years. The second resulted in the definition of a
geographic limit that have lasted until the present: the departement. This
new administrative entity was smaller than the royal 'Generalite'. Its boundaries
were defined by the following criteria: A trip back and forth from the most
remote part of the department to its capital had to be completed in one day on
horse back. The Constituante also aknowledged the regional specificity in its
geographical definition of the departments. By doing that, according to the
geographer Jean Brunhes, the Constituante brought back to lifee entire provinces.
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The Revolution, contrary to what have been said did not 'balkanize' the provinces
to better assume the domination of Paris but tried to define practical as well as
locally sensibles departemental boundaries.
1-3 The reinforcement of Parisian domination.
As a man of war Napoleon Bonaparte considered the civil society in the
image of military society. As soon he is named Consul, he replaces the
'Directoires de departements' elected at the second degree, by state employee
that can be replaced at will: the prefects. Thus by an irony of which history is
accustomed, the departements will serve goals symmetrically opposed to the one
they were created for. The 'Prefets' and 'Sous Prefets' become the instrument of
administrative centralization. As Tocqueville commented it: " From the guts of a
nation that first got rid of the Monarchy came at once a widespread power, more
detailed, more absolute, than the power that had been exercised by any of our
Kings.". It is curious that, although both royalists and Republicans agreed on its
excess,
the military centralism, born with Napoleon I, remained unchanged by the
following, although extremely different, regimes: The Restoration, the July
Monarchy, the Second Empire and three successives republics. The explanation
seems to lie in the fact that this was a matter of convenience for structurally
unstable regimes and ,in the case of the Second Empire, corresponded to the
prevalent political conceptions of the bourgeois societe.
However, the Napoleonian centralism would have remained limited, at least in
scale, if the world had not witness an economic change. The Eotechnic phase of
the water and wood complex as defined by Geedes and Mumford was replaced by
the poleotechnic stage of coal and steel complex that introduced a direct
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relationship between size and output. Thus, the industrial geography of the
western world changed from a decentralized to a centralized pattern. This trend
was multiplied, in France, by the decision to centralize the train network around
Paris, thus concentrating the bulk of France' industry in the Paris region. The fact
that there was a general consensus to design a system that was so dramatically
favoring Paris and preempting the regions economic development is revealing of
the power of the centralist ideology on the politico - administrative class at that
time. In effect, there was no economic or technical justification for such a
decision. In fact, the construction of the railroad network was a real chance to
redevelop the economy of the regions; a chance that was purposly unused. Such
an opportunity was not to exist anymore: The very fact of the desequilibrium
between Paris and the province made extremely difficult any attempt to
decentralize. The planners of the Fifties, for instance, although they were generally
favorable to the economic decentralization of France ( the influential pro
decentralization manifestoe of the geographer Gravier was published in 1947) had
to balance the need for regionnalization with the necessity to consolidate the
investments already made in Paris which were essential for the economic future
of France.
All the other europeans railroad systems have a decentralised structure. In the
Netherlands, Utrecht is the center of the railroad network - not Amsterdam; in
England, although London is central the system provided for many transversal
lines. On the contrary, the system designed by the engineer Jean Baptiste Legrand
provides only one transversal west-east line which was designed because of the
political pressure exerted at the Assembly by Lamartine (then also a congressman).
However, this line was so under equipped that it was quicker to fret the material
through Paris than to use it. The transit, in Paris, of the fret was then compulsory
because of the distance that separated the stations terminating each regional line.
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The public works of Haussmann will organize (and reinforce) the urban
consequences of the economic centralization of France over Paris. The question of
centralization will began to be discussed only in the 1950, some tentatives of '
deconcentration ' planned by the state in the mid - Sixties. The French society
had to wait for the radical critics of the events of May 1968 to seriously
examine the question of regionnalisation versus economic centralizati
centralization, local autonomy versus administrative centralization, local identity
over republican unity and the like.
Yet, as of today, the debate remains essentially political and reaches extremely
slowly the phase of implementation.
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11 PARIS
2.1 Paris, a thousand years of formation. ( From 360 to 1360
In 360, Lutece takes the name of its people, the Parisi and becomes Paris. In
the Fifth century the Roman Empire collapses. The Paris region becomes a Gallo -
Roman state which, until 486, resists to the invasions of the Francs. In 508,
Clovis settles in Paris for strategic reasons. The Kings transform Paris into a
Christian town that rivals with Tours, then dominant. The political supremacy of
Paris remain stable until 600 when it is rivaled by several cities. Paris, however,
remains prosperous.
The Carolingien kings inherit a town of 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants. However,
as the Empire extends to Germany and Italy, Paris loses its central p position. Its'
development slows down. Aix becomes the Imperial residence but Paris is still an
economaly important city. From 845 to 861, Paris is attacked by the Vikings but
ultimately resists to the last attack in 885-886. As the Vikings are settling in
Normandy, Paris becomes 'Place Frontiere'. This strategic position wiil play an
important role in the future of Paris. In effect, as a new Viking invasion is
menacing the city the king is settling againin Paris and the Viking threats will
keep them will keep him in in Paris.
An important part of Paris destiny is then played. Thanks to the king, the city
will escape from the pressure of the nobility. At the same time, Paris does not
participate in the 'Communal revolution' and will not have a'Charte'. Its
inhabitants will be 'Bourgeois of the King'. The return of the king triggers
numerous restorations and constructions. The Town follows the common pattern
I
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of the'double city' is divided in two parts: the 'bourg' and the 'cite'. The cite is
animated by numerous important works such as the construction of the kings
palace and the new cathedral Notre - Dame. The city as a whole expands quickly.
The active economic centers are the bourg Saint - Marcel and the bourg Saint
Germain. Paris, in the 12 century, also experiences an intellectual renewal.
With the kingdom of Philippe-Auguste, Paris is (end of the 12,begining of the
13 century) not yet the capital of France but has definitely a leading role. Its
strategic position and the policy of an authoritarian king will trigger some new
developments. Because of the proximity of the English, the kings commands the
construction of a defense wall which measures 5300 meters into which is
integrated the Louvre castle. The wall protects 250 hectares of land and achieves
the unity of the town. The protection of the walls attracts more pop ulation, a
migration encouraged by the king. Philippe-Auguste wants Paris to become the
center of action of the monarchy. The walls, the permanent storage of the
archives after 1194, the important judicial function performed by the Palais; all
these elements contribute to this scheme. Paris becomes a prominent center of
the intellectual and religious life. As the new enceinte wall is just being finished,
many settlements are already expanding at its periphery. The kings will have to
grant the right to construct outside the walls in 1240.
In 1261, Saint-Louis, a very powerful and charsimatic king,reorganise the
administration of the city which he splits in two between the 'Prevot des
Marchands" for the local affairs and the 'Prevot du Roi" for the affairs of the
state. The enlargement of the king palace, the construction of Notre-Dame and of
new pavilions for the market of 'Les Halles' ; the fame of the university are
shaping the physionomy of Paris of the 13 century. At that time, Paris also
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becomes the center of Theology as the fame of the king transforms it as the
capitale of the Diplomacy.
Some essential characteristics of Paris are then taking place.The rural suburbs
will not evolve drastically until the 19 century. The role of Paris as a capital; as
well as the government of France by the Parisians will be definitely decided with
the integration of the feudal nobility of the region into the royal administration.
Also, very importantly, it is the time of the passage from the Ancient national
road network, centered around Lyon, to the modern road network centered around
Paris.
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2.2 Paris, capitale of France.
Philippe le Bel amplifies these trends by centralizing the administration of
France in Paris. The king develops the administrative services and reorganizes the
Palais de la Cite. Paris is then a city housing 80,000 inhabitants of which 10,000
are students. It is a very high density for the Middle-Ages : 182 inhabitants by
hectare. Venice, Milan and Paris are the three large towns of Europe. From 1300
to 1360, Paris becomes an international financial place. Paris is not only the
capitale of the unique large state of Occident; it is also the main diplomatic and
universitary center.
A new war triggers the construction of new fortifications in 1356. Their
construction will be supervised by Etienne Marcel, the Merchants' Provost. The
new wall wil protect 166 additional hectares than the wall of Philippe Auguste
did. Paris now covers an area ov 439 hectares. At the same time, the Parisians
become conscious of the importance of their support to the king as well as of
the potential menace they represent for him. In 1306, a first riot moves Charles V
from the Palais de la Cite, too central, to a residence close to the gates of the
city. A short time after, the king will settle in Vincennes , a bourg located just
outside Paris. The castle of Vincennes is fortified to resist any possible attack of
the Parisians.
During the first half of the 14 century, Paris experiences many troubles revolts
and occupations. The Anglo-Bourguignonne domination, the civil war that results
will end an era of Paris which had lived for thirty years in a mood of besiege.
Many unkept buildings will collapse during this period and the density of Paris
diminishes. In 1450, Paris will take off again. Around 1500, the density is again
very high. However, Paris is the economic center of an area rangingonly from 50
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to 200 kilometers. It is a town without industry. Paris does not have a bank, but
is an investment center. In reaction of the riots of the preceding epoch, the king
strictly controls the city. He supervises the activities of the merchants and
reduces the independence of the University which had been politically active
during the riots. Curiously enough, it is when Paris is officially promulgated
capital of France that the king leaves Paris to settle on the Loire river. The royal
administration, however, remains in Paris.
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2-3. Paris and the problems of the large town:
The public works of the Kings.
In the 16 century, medieval Paris enters a crisis. The town has reached its
natural limits : the swamps. The authorities simultaneously discover the problems
of the large town (150,000 to 200,000 inhabitants): the difficulty of organizing the
food delivery, the police, the cost of maintenance, etc.
Paris expands within itself, its free spaces are constructed. The Louvre is
renovated and the construction of the Tuilreries palace outside the walls begins.
The necessity to construct the palace wil trigger the extension of the walls to the
west. In 1566, a new defense wall is constructed : Les Fosses Jaunes.
The rents increase and around 1650 the lower income segments of the
population will have to share a house between several families. The hygienic
habits of the Middle-Ages decline while some neighborhoods become excessively
dirty. A problem of circulation arise. Francois j is asking aligned and straight
streets. In 1563, the parliament asks for the outlawing of the private carosse
coaches ).
The economic activity slows down, a type of Parisian bureaucrat emerges, a
social category which will not favor the economic dynamism. The city of Paris
lends money to the king and constructs a new Hotel de Ville. The Parisians are
upset by increasing fiscal charges. In addition, religious troubles are burting all
over the coutry. The city rebels against the king that besieges it and supresses all
its privileges.
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The confiscation of the city privileges concentrates all the decision power in
the king hands. This fact, coupled with the repercussion , in France , of the Italian
Renaissance will trigger the kings' policy of public works.
This policy will be continued from then on by all the kings and will
dramatically change the city fabric. It is important to realize, that, until then, no
open space had been really designed in Paris. The only exception is the 'Place de
greve' which is really an open piece of land conecting the Hotel de Ville and the
main port of Paris. This was not, by any means, a urban square as they began to
be designed in Italy in the Quattrocento.
What had been designeb until then were important buildings such as the kings
palace, Notre Dame, the university, churches and the aristocratic and bourgeois
hotels. But in the 16 century and extensively in the 17 century the design will
focus on open spaces. In the 16 century two important projects are launched.
The first one, the restoration of the Louvre marks the interest of the king for
Paris (although he was residing in Fontainebleau.). The works begin in 1531 after
the Louvre had been deserted by the kings since 1380. The second one, the
construction, outside the walls, of the Tuileries palace and related pleasure
gardens annuce a new era for Paris. The idea of gardens outside the walls is the
introduction by Catherine de Medicis of a new idea of italian derivation. The
Tuileries, according to E. Bacon will " (...) set in motion a thrust of design which
conveyed the energy, previously compressed in the city walls, across the
countryside " (1). Indeed, the protection of the palace of the Tuileries and the
gardens, previously designed as a self contained independant structure, by the
new wall of the Fosse-Jaunes will launch the extension to the west of the city.
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The construction of the first Royal squares inside Paris will only begin with
the return of the king, Henri IV, to the city. The city had been largerly destroyed
by the religious wars, the rents had been reduced of a third or were simply
unpayed. Paris knew a general climate of violence which provoked the merciless
repression of the king and his friend, the Merchants' Provost. Henri IV decides to
tackle the problems of the city globally. He cannot, however, draft a master-plan
as the one that already existed in Amsterdam since 1606, but he will embark on a
very ambitious policy of public works which will reanimate the town and serve
the prestige of the king. His leading planning principle is to juxtapose to the
ancient neighborhoods new areas that would be more open and ordered and would
connennect themselves with the old town.
Henri IV is, thus, renovating the Pont-Neuf. In the process, he decides to
destroy the houses that were constructed on the bridge to clear the vista of the
Louvre. This decision, based on the abstract urban theories or the Renaissance, is
a precedent for all the designs to follow. It also constitutes precedent for the
clearance of all the houses built on the bridges of Paris. Henri IV connects the
Pont-Neuf with the rue Dauphine to the south and with the place Dauphine in the
centre. In the Marais, one major operation : The Place Royale. At first planned as
an economic nuclei, the square becomes the multi - purpose room of the
aristocracy. The square is not connected to the traffic and the statue in its middle
will be erected later.
One major project, the Place de France, will be abandonned because of its
economic impossibility. However, the project marks a change of scale both in
terms of area and meaning in comparision to the Place Dauphine and the Place
Royale. In effect, these two squares came out of objective needs (linkage, socio
and economic needs) while the latter was purely spectacular and monumental, the
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triumphal entrance to Paris. The Place Dauphine project was a sort of 'urban
surgery' connecting, over the Seine two districts of Paris , creating a place for
popular manifestations such as fairs and markets: the bridge iself. The entire
operation was probably subsidized by the aristocratic hotels surroounding the
quiet Place Dauphine ( originally closed on her third side ) . If Henri IV does not
have the financial means of a spectacular policy, the following kings will have it.
However, in his attempts to monumentalize the city, Henri IV will make
compulsory the alignment of the houses, forbid the corbelling and the wood
construction - although he will not succeed in enforcing these new laws.
Under Louis XIII , the city grows without controll and is characterised by the
important activities of speculators which will develop new neighborhoods. A new
problem irritates the Parisians: the multiplication of the coaches. A promenade is
then constructed : Le Cours la Reine.
As Europe faces a general economic depression between 1650 and 1730, the
extraordinary expansion of Paris slows down under Louis XIV. The economic
situation worsens and violence explodes again in the city. The towns falls again
under the control of the king. With Louis XIV and Colbert, the organization and
the rationalization of the city, of art and architecture, began with Henri IV will
really start. In order to effectivelly control Paris, a new position is created: the
Lieutenant de Police, until then a prerogative of the Merchants' Provost. The
Lieutenant de Police, La Reynie, proceeds to supress the homeless shelters and
gets rid of the last area controled by the thieves. The municipal lighting and the
paving of the streets of Paris is extended but the city remains dirty because of
the passivity of its inhabitants. The first exact plan of Paris is drawn (as opposed
to the aerial views of the 16 century) that allows to follow the evolution of the
capital. Paris in liberated from of its two boundaries : The swamps and the
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defense walls. In effect, Vauban has fortified the frontier leaving Paris relatively
safe from the invasions. Paris expands on its periphery, specifically on the west
side with the Feaubourgs g Saint Germain and Saint Honore. The place Vedome is
then a large speculative project of aristocratic hotels.
Paris is not only the capital but the economic center of the kingdom. A value
market appears, the state and royal manufactures are employ several thousand of
workers. At the same time the problems of the city are amplified. A great
number of private squares of the church and the aristocracy (including royal
properties) will be open to the public. The delivery of food to Paris becomes a
national problem. The monarchy is alarmed and thinks of the destiny of the great
cities of Antiquity which, as " (...) they had reched this rt of excessive size had
bear in themselves the seeds of their own destruction." The ultimate reaction of
the monarchy to stop the expansion of Paris is to withdraw from the Tuileries to
settle in Versailles in 1680. It is a very well thought strategy (the creation of a
satellite town ) which is, however, not pushed all the way. In any circumstances,
this decision comes too late. Paris is then the capital of the intellectual and the
scientific, a world center for the religious activities that seriously rivals Rome.
During the 18 century, Paris expands very quickly in conjunction with the
economical take off of the century but, also, in relation to local factors. One of
these factors is the tendency, all along the century , of the court to desert
Versailles and to settle in Paris. In 1724, the king tries again, unsuccessfully to
set a limit to the city. The period is characterized by the intensive construction
of buildings, some of which reach up to nine stories.
The necessity to plan this growth becomes urgent. The big operation is the
Place de la Concorde planned under Louis XV. The place de la Concorde is the
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product of an 'Urban Art" which has reached its climax. It is designed (in 1753) to
articulate together the new developed feaubourgs Saint Honore and the Chaussee
d'Antin with the great axis of the Tuileries and the vegetal perspective of the
Champs Elysees designed by Lenotre (on the model of the Versailles garden)
which vanishes at the infinite.
It is important to realize how much the 'Urban Art " of the kings has evolved
from the punctual development of isolated royal squares to the development of
an overall system which connects the city altogether. In the early developments
of Paris, when it was still divided between the Cite and the Bourgs ( the Ville
double) its unity had been given by its defense walls . This had in fact been true
all along the development of the city which remained essentially poly
- nuclear, that is structured with different centers each of which has a precise
function but none of which being dominant. Each of the centers was independant
and had specific boundaries and specific populations. The only link between these
feaubourgs and their population was the fear of the invasion. This was reflected
by the behavior of the institution none of which tried to plan for the larger
community but for its own purpose and community. It is only when institution,
the state, an-d one function, the administration (the bureacrat parisian) becomes
dominant in the city that Paris will be conceived of and planned as a whole. The
urbanism of the kings is not only 'great' because it succesfully faces the
problems caused expansion of Paris and proposes skilfull solutions to problems
such as circulation and the interconnection of several areas it is great because it
imposes one order, demonstrates one power over the city space through the
interconnection of monumental spaces and the standardizationof the street scape.
In short, the urbanism of the kings begins within the aristocratic values of
separation and privacy but it ends to the contrary transforming the empty spaces
of the city into the public manifestation of the state.. This creates a precedent
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and will be the basis of the urban design of all the following central
administrations of France the I and the 11 Empire, butalso the modern plans of
today.
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CHAPTER 2
FROM GRAND DESIGN TO DECADENCE.
Introduction.
It is the bourgeoisy of the second Empire that formulated the plan that
would dramatically transform Paris-and by spillover effect-its entire region. In
effect, Haussmann approach to the planning of Paris was radically different from
everything that had been designed until then. Paris, of course, had evolved under
the kings.But the kings approach to planning had evolved slowly. The plans of
Haussmann, on the contrary, were caracterized by a dramatic change of scale of
intervention that the urbanism of the kings had in* a sense prepared and
announced. If the kings had over the years perfected the art of urban design (I'
Art Urbain) Haussmann invented the science of urbanism and introduced the scale
in which we live and at which we plan today.
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I Restructuration and extension of Paris under the second Empire:
The public works of Haussmann.
Haussmann marks an important shift of attitude towards the city. This is
firstly because his rational is not guided by one set of criteria objectives but
rather by a multiplicity of them. His approach to the city is not piecemeal but
forms a whole. In planning the city, Haussmann exhibits the qualities of a
bourgeois multiplied by the ones of an energic civil servant. His preoccupations
are multiple. As a bourgeois he is eager to match the grandeur of aristocracy.
Therefore, urban design in Paris must be more spectacular than it ever was. In
fact,not only the new Paris of the second Empire must encompass " Grands
Projets " at the monumental scale but in fact it is central Paris in its totality that
becomes monume In effect, if a monument like the Invalides (a military
hospital)is the appropriate metaphor for a military power such as the one of
Napoleon the first, the appropriate metaphor for the colonialist and affairist
bourgeoisy of the second Empire extends to the city itself. The project has
changed scale and objective. What should be monumental, what should be an
appropriate metaphor? In what part of the city should the bourgeoisy inscribe the
symbols of its dominance? Quite logically it is what characterize the bourgeoisy
(its dynamism,its mobility) that will serve as a metaphor: It is the avenues and
the railway stations placed at their end -the modern means of
communications-that are the framework of Haussmann plans. It is quite clear that
the avenues and the stations are not merely " functionnal ". The avenues are
emphasized by the continuous stone facades and the the stations are carefully
calculated to fit in a monumental vista. The residents and prominent users of the
avenues are bourgeois: The former looking at the sight of the latter strolling (
like in a parade!) along the avenues by foot or carriage- To see and to be seen.
Moreover the very scene of the daily activities in the avenues is the one of a
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dynamic economy occuring in an appropriate environment where everything
happens in an orderly fashion -as opposed to the chaos of a market day in the
medieval city. This is also a metaphor for the commercial society of the second
empire. The facades are the decorum that emphasize the new urban scene: the
commercial scene. When the aristocratic reflexe was to hide from the public, the
bourgeois wants to monopolize the public space.
However the 'technical approach' to the city is a crucial one that even the
need for spectacular urban design does not surpass. In effect, the avenues are
actually linking economic nuclei. Haussmann is very concerned with constructing
up to date sewage systems and servicing the city with an extensive urban
furniture. Indeed the engineer which is commissioned to solve these problems will
innovate in a large domain, ranging from water ducts systems design to traffic
studies. This is the Paris of "le Confort Urbain" of "les Commodites Urbaines".
With the engineer, the technical precision appears in city design : This is evident
for one that compares the absolute straightness of the boulevard Sebastopol to
the narrow and rather sinuous pattern of the previous north-south connections :
the rue du faubourg Saint Denis and the rue Saint Martin. The conjunction of the
need to transform Paris as a large spectacular entity and of a very practical down
to earth spirit resulted in a very curious and innovative approach to the buildings
that represented past powers. Where the governments would have previously
ignored, destroyed or let collapse the monuments marks of preceeding powers;
Haussmann chooses to actively coopt them. The monuments are purely
recuperated and integrated to the new city planning concept. Why should you
waste these resources that can promote the city? On the contrary the monuments
can be helpful to achieve a successful marketing of the city. You want to make
them even more visible than before and associate them to your scheme. The way
to achieve this is in fact rather simple. You just need to increase the space
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around the monuments and connect those spaces to the general circulation
network. The"parvis" of Notre-Dame is a point in case. Haussmann considerably
enlarge it so that the monument is not anymore a metaphor of the catholic
church, only, but - primarly - of Paris.
There is another criteria for the design of Paris. This is the one of security
and control. Although it has been very often exaggerated, this argument remains
valid. I believe it has two aspects. The new avenues are really very efficient
access for the troops. But they also have a spillover effect, that, over the years
can be even more efficient than the troops. It creates an unprecedented
gentrification in the areas they serve and isolate other areas that then collapse
economically and physically. This is true for popular neighborhoods such as the
"quartier Mouffetard"
However it would be untrue to describe Haussmann as a machiavelic, class
conscious planner. This would not account for all the reformist, enlightned aspects
of the urban policy of Haussmann. In fact, these aspects really come from the
influence of Napoleon Ill who, having been lived in London, is very impressed by
the English hygienic theories and experience of squares to fight the epidemic,the
pollution and so on. This realm will account for all the squares and woods
planned by Haussmann. The woods were implemented in the periphery whereas the
squares were mostly constructed (for obvious reasons of capital) in the areas
outside of the wall of the Fermiers Generaux annexed in 1861. These areas are
also interesting because they constitute another part of the Paris of Hausmann
where he planned rather different things than in the new enlarged and rationnalized
center.
Haussmann not only increased the scale of planning thinking; he increased the
size of the city. The expansion of central Paris was not really a new fact since
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it was at the origin cirumscribed to the Ile de la Cite and then expanded to the
arrondissements along the right bank until the peripherical faubourgs and the
quartier Latin"cristallized"themselves into the center. Since the dynasty of the
Capetiens the kings had tried to stop the expansion of Paris by constructing walls
that they had later to destroy under the housing developments pressure. However
it is the first time with Haussmann that someone had made the decision to
expand Paris and planned it. Quite significantly the new areas were planned on a
different scale than the center but rather at the one of a village or more
precisely at the scale of the old faubourgs. The peripherical settlements
consisted of the suburbs that were edificated under Louis - Philippe ( since 1830 )
outside the belt of the Fermiers Generaux. Before the "Murs d Octroi" ( a wall
constructed between 1784 and 1791 where anyone entering the city had to pay a
fee.) were demolish the city housed some 1,200,000 inhabitants in its relatively
small perimeter of 3,288 hectares. The annexion increased the city to 7,088
hectares (2 times the original size) for a population of 16,000 residents (+ 400,000
inhabitants) as of the Jannuary 1, 1860. The annexation was a rather ambitious
project. In effect, the new sector was only serviced by small suburban roads and
consisted of a number of speculative housing projects that had been anarchically
constructed in the last 20 years. The development and the linkage of a road
system was one problem. The second one was to create neighborhood centers,
dynamic and autonomous enough to attract and retain the surrounding population.
Traditionally, the method to create centers was to edificate a church whose
weekly services assured the prosperity of commerce. Since the first Empire the
animation of the neighborhoods had been achieved through the construction of
important peripherical markets that decentralized the principal market, called Les
Halles. This favored the permanence of commerce through the concentration of
clientele. Spontaneously, an agglomeration of vital functions began to
incrementally encroach the church to ultimately become what constitutes the
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Haussmannian program of the center: The church flanked with the school and the
fire brigade barrack and the Mairie (with a night asylum), the square and the
market. The church of "La Villette" constructed between 1841 and 1844 is a good
example of this model. To the market and the church the second Empire added
the square that symbolized the generous dreams of the Emperor,who saw in it a
toolto 'moralize' the workers as well as an hygienic principle. As I mentionned
before the squares were always scarce and small in central Paris for obvious
economic reasons. But in the peripherical neighborhoods, they were larger. As a
matter of fact, a hierarchy of open spaces had been established by Haussmann
on the basis of their frequentation. The neighborhood square was intended for the
daily uses,the larger urban park was located at proximity of the users housing
while the suburban woods planned for exceptionnal use were implemented at a
remote location. However, the most important innovation of the second empire
was the 'Mairie'. Since 1830 the mairie emerged in its double vocation as an
official and administrative facility but also as a 'commissariat de police',
permanence of the national guard, 'office de bienfaisance' and even as a popular
universsity. From all these aspects, emerged the Mairie in his final modern
version, that is both as a social center, a barrack and the secular temple of civil
marriage.
In conclusion.
The second empire had a very clear vision of what should be done with
Paris. The operation was divided into two steps. At first the historical Paris had
to be enlarged,rationnalized to become the symbol -at the world scale- of colonial
France. Secondly, a number of sub-centers, autonomous - but not independant,
from the principal center- were planned to revolve around it. The two parts were
to form a new entity. This is, I think, very clear when one looks at the very
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deterministic and particular way in which the ancient suburban municipalities were
replaced by the larger new neighborhood centers. In effect, they were
systematically planned in a different location. None of the 'mairies' of the ten
new arrondissements was located in a pre-existing center. Moreover, each of the
new centers-even if they were placed in a different location from the pre-existing
ones- was arranged to be connected to the new general road system. The
planning of Haussmann introduced the notion of the hierarchy of centers ( that
itself introduced a hierarchy of open spaces, roads etc...) This idea of smaller
centers, autonomous in daily life but economically and politically subordinated to
the larger will be at the basis (at another scale) of the 1965 scheme for the
Parisian new towns.
Although the urbanism of Haussmann was not regulated or formulated by a rigid
theory ( it was a practice of constant adaptation to circumstances ; a dynamic
and pragmatic approach); it was always inscribed in a global vision of the city.
If Haussmann urban practice is characterised by a succession of decisions it was
nevertheless conditionned by a permanent global conscience of the whole that
guaranteed the continuity of the concepts through multiple decisions. This
pragmatic approach guided by a kind of overall concept is also a characteristic
inherited by the planners of the Paris region in the 1960's. However, their success
in keeping the continuity of the concept and in achieving projects of quality can
be seriously questionned, specially for the decade following 1965.
Il The Commune.
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The important shifts that had appear in the social structure of Paris (the
number of workers living in Paris had incresed whereas the number of artissans
and bourgeois remained stable) were traumatic for the city. Paris, was,
traditionnally, a city where the social classes were equally represented with,
perhaps, a greater representation of the lower middle class ( Artisans, etc...) The
concentration of the prolerariat in Paris is one of the major causes of the
troubles of 1871. After the Communne the social relationships are poisonned. The
multiplication of denunciations clearly demonstrate the social rupture of the city
between the rich and the poor neighborhoods and even between the lower
bourgeoisy (the artisans) and the proletariat, who, until then, were unified.
Ill The Third republic between 1871 - 1914.
During the third republic (1871-1914) not much is done to ameliorate the
condition of Paris. The financial charge inherited from Haussmann the lack of
authority, the indulgence vis a vis of the speculators will mark this epoch. Some
remaining works of Haussmann will be executed, such as the Avenue de l'Opera
but, basically, the projects ofthis period are a mutiplicity of unrelated operations
which are sometimes carried out without any regard to the old fabric. The
Universal Expositions of 1878, 1889 and 1900 will leave a number of monuments
which were not related to any plan and moreover were iomplemented in already
well structured neighborhoods. Most importantly, the suburbs, where the bulk of
the expansion now occurs because of the lower rents (The elevator has appeared,
in Paris, unifying the social composition of each building) are now growing
without any control. The Habitations a Bon Marche (low income housing) are the
object of discussions but will not be concretised before 1896. Paris is, more
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than ever, the capital of the literary, artistic and scientific world. The nightlife
will develop with the progress of municipal lighting All of this formed, in the
Provinces, a brilliant image of Paris, partly mithycal, that played a key role in the
people's motivation to immigrate from the country.
IV The third republic between 1914 and 1945.
Introduction.
The very success of the policy of concentration on Paris became very
quickly a major problem. The convergence of the railroad systeminto Paris, the
massive migration of the labor force contributed to form around the capital the
greatest industrial center of the country with 1,250,000 workers in 1933. From
1911 to 1936 some 60.000 inhabitants flowed back from Paris to its suburbs. In
1936, Central Paris is only the dense center (2,829,753 inhabitants ,365 inhabitants
by hectare - 6 times the density of New-York city) of an agglomeration of
6,190,457 inhabitants. In the course of 70 years, before the crisis of 1929 the
population of the city had increased by 70% ; the population of the suburbs by
500%.
4-1 Paris.
A.Sutcliffe remarks that 1914 marks the begining of a period of "abondunment
of Grand-Design" in central Paris. A strong conservationnist partyrty was building
himself. The administration had to compromise with it by hiring the urban
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historian Marcel Poete in the Paris Extension Committee. After the war the
annulment of pre-war projects was inevitable. Yet, the public Committee was
opposed to the complete renunciation of these projects. It wanted to proceed on
the basis of a scheme reduced to more manageable proportions. However, the
committee decided, in 1921, to not use the right of expropriation (widely used by
Haussmann) ,a decision that seriously precluded the implementation of any
scheme. " Naturally enough, we shall evict tenants only if it is possible to do so.
It is not our intention to run the risk of aggravating the rent crisis." (|) A further
dicouragement to continue the public works was the impossibility to tax
betterment values. Also, in order to save expenses, the city had to buy the
buildings necessary for the implementation of the schemes only when they would
reach the market. (rather than to proceed by eviction and pay high compensation
fees.). One last factor argued gainst the public works policy: street improvement
was no longer considered to be as effective a public health measure and had
therefore to be justified on traffic grounds alone. A subsequent improvement of
the traffic would have necessitatedan enormous expenditure of the state.
This conjunction of elements lead the authorities to judge that the age of the
great streets improvements was over. The few schemes completed between 1918
and 1939 were only made possible by the piecemeal purchase of individual
properties , or by collaboration with some private interests as with the
Samaritaine ( a large retail store) in 1929 for the widening of the banks of the
Louvre.
In any case, by the late 1930's, it was generally argued by the authorities that
new streets to be of any real use for solving traffic congestion should at least
measure forty meters wide. The idea of a new scheme based on such street
dimensions being infeasable; the policy adopted was just to let it go. Perhaps the
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automatic traffic lights introduced in 1923 was thought of as the panacea for all
traffic problems.
However, it is more likely true to say that the mood was just not r ight to
undertake large and courageous redevelopment schemes. In addition, the
demagogic freeze of the rents started the degradation of a large part of Paris
housing stock. But it is in the suburbs that the inaction of the authorities had the
more dramatic effect.
4-2 The suburbs.
As a result of the double effect of the high rents of the wealthy parts of
Paris and of the degradation of the housing stock due to the rent freeze; the
lower income segments of the population had to flow back in the suburbs.
The decision to construct the metro within the city boundaries (and avoid the
penetration of the suburbs ) did nothing but to increase the existing distinction
between Central Paris and its suburbs, between priviledged and underprivileged
districts.
Nothing is done in terms of green space either. Although a project to
transform the old fortifications and the military zone into a green belt is studied;
the demagogy of the responsibles and the pressure of interest will terminate the
project before it had even taken off. The zone will only receive a few amenities
(sport facilities, the Cite Universitaire). Instead of a large redevelopment project
the zone will be covered by so many shacks (This until the late forties) that the
zone became synonamous with slums. The only reaction of the authorities is as
irresponsible as the decision to freeze the rentsin Paris. In effect, the Loi
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Loucheur, voted in 1928, encourages the individual construction in the suburbs.
However, the law falls short of providing a plan to organize the new dwellers. As
a result, thousands of hectares of land are covered with dwellings to which no
infrastructure is provided and which are often located as far as 45 minutes of
walking distance from the railway station. The daily displacement of the
working population is counted in hours as the charge of the public services
skyrockets.
The terrible life conditions of the suburbs, their social structure being
predominently composed of the working class, the feeling that the suburbs are
left alone by the governement- all those factors contributed to the formation in
the suburbs of a politically radicalized enclave. In effect, only the communist
party takes care of the problems of the suburbs and provides the organisational
skills that the suburbs desperatly needs. When a communist mayor is elected he
tends to be an efficient manager for its collectivity. This explains why,
ultimately, the suburbs will fall, almost uniquely, under the control of the
communist party and of some progressive socialists. The suburbs will be
nicknamed the "Red Belt".
PAGE 39
CHAPTER 11I
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN FRENCH URBANISM THEORIES.
Introduction.
Paradoxically, it is in the period where nothing is actually planned for Paris
and its agglomeration that the French urbanism will mature. At first the
theoretical principles will be developed in Paris and, later , those principles will
be applied in the colonies.
This movement is started by two interconnected realms. The first comes from
the architects. The writings of Camillo Sitte and his school had succeededto win a
place for the architect in the town-planning process. It is then quite natural that
architects would be instrumental in the establishement , in France, of urban
studies and town planning as disciplines in the early 1900. ( The word urbanism
was first coined, in France, about 1910.). Rome-prize winning architects, working
academically at the Villa Medici between 1899 and 1909, such as H. Prost, E.
Hebrard, L.Jausselly, T. Garnier and D.A. Agache will formulate the principles,
conceptions and professionnal objectives which were to constitute, later, the
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fundaments of French planification. They rejected the academic work on single
monuments of the Beaux-Arts in favor of a comprehensive approach on the larger
and more complex urban scale. They were very active in the formation of the
"Musee Social" (an institution devoted to examine all the aspects of urban
planification) and of the Societe Francaise des Urbanistes in 1911.
The second realm came from a larger movement of awarness of informed
professionnals. They were people as different as industrialists, catholic militants,
trade unionists, sociologists, geographers, criminologists, politicians and
governemental and municipal officials. All those people formed a network of '
progressives ' which paralleled and supported the research of the new
"Architects-Urbanists". Some tentatives of a multi - disciplinary approach to
town planning were ried by the prefect, Justin de Selves. He set up the Paris
committee as a mixed commitee of municipal officials and outside experts. The
committee released in 1913 a report on the Paris agglomeration. Although the
Committees'deliberation were of a purely explanatory nature, it recommended that
a plan should be studied on the Seine departement as a whole.
Nothing tangible, however, was to be achieved by these movements in the
context of Paris: The Paris Committee recommendations will disappear in the post
-war period whereas the architects of the "Musee Social ( despite the urgence of
the urban situation ) will not be able to find a commission at the urban scale
in France.
In order to find such work, they will go abroad, essentially to the colonies.
The colonies were an optimal environment to test the implementation of the
urban theories where the strong colonial power supressed all problems of
resistance that one encounters through the usual procedures The suburbs did not
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constitute such an environment and it was probaly judged by the central
administration as too troublesome to organize. Moreover no profit was to be
made from restructuring the suburbs (only costs could possibly be involved). In
the colonies, the profit to be made was immense and was worth some initial
investment.
I Theory and city design in the colonies.
1.1 The objectives.
The connection between the politico- administrative sphere and the new
architects-urbanists led to the urban colonial experience.
The outcome was twofold.
Firstly, starting with a critical analysis of the situation in France, architects-
urbanists working in the colonies looked at the colonies experience as a social
and aesthetic laboratory where they could test the efficiency of their principles
and design before they could apply them to France.
Secondly,from the administration point of view, the architects could so ve the
problems of long time residence of the French in the colonies; they could design
in the colonies an environment of quality with important facilities which would
retain and attract the European population. They would also structure through the
environment the assimilation of the native population to the French system (which
a more valid long term control, than the military controll of the first phase.)
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The second point explains why the architecture of the newtowns refered to the
local traditions but the urban design was tipically french: the civic square,
avenues, promenades and the like. On one hand was aknowledging the colonised
culture and provided in the environment some signs to which the native
population could refer ( Thus facilitating their assimilation ); on the other hand
they expressed spatially the structure of the centralised power. The recognition
of the cultural differences did not mean a belief in egality; on the contrary,
architecture and urban planification were considered as the ultimate means to
demonstrate the superiority of the French as a civilization, as a nation, and as the
members of a race. Moreover, the newtowns would recall and demonstrate this
superiority to the Europeans themselves.
Can we speak of machiavelism, of cynism or of cold machination? If we did
we would have to try, however, to not look at the french colons monolhitically.
For instance, there was a genuine interest of the architects for the local
building traditions. It might well not have been the case for the administrators.
The administrators, themselves, did not necessarly understand their action as a
vast operation of propaganda in the service of the imperialist power but rather as
the "Mission Civilisatrice de la France". Foucault has described (La Volonte de
Savoir, Rabinow, p125) this kind of behavior: " The rationality of power, it is one
of tactics, often very explicit at the limited level where they are inscribed (...) the
responsibles are often without hypocrisy."
The newtowns were designed to express the hierarchy of cultures. The
administrative sector, like the industrial and residential sectors involved a
segregation of the populations. The mixing of the native and european population
was avoided -it was supposedly as bad fot the native cultural integrity as for the
health of the Europeans. In any case, the spatial dicontinuity between the native
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and european towns is probably one of the most striking characteristics of the
French colonial urbanism. One can also argue, however that this planned
discontinuity was not only a "colonial reflex " but was also imbedded in the
architects cartesian rationnalization of the problem of the modern town. The
project of the "industrial city" of Tony Garnier is a case in point. Garnier had
design this project in 1901-1902 as a model for the future industrial town. This
plan, situated in france, is divided into differentiated functionnal zones,linked
together around an existing town which is saved for the unique purpose of
tourism. It is a similar pattern that H. Prost will follow in designing the new
towns of Marocco.
I will now discuss of two significant planning and design experiences of the
colonies; Ernest Hebrard in Indochine and Henri Prost in Marocco.
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1-2 E. Hebrard and Indochina
E. Hebrard is still residing at the Villa Medici while he works on his project
of the "World City". His project, in a way, parallels the industrial city of
T.Garnier in that they both attempt to master the modern scale of the city.
Contrary to Garnier, however, Hebrard does not attempt to change the
architectural style of his building neither does he tries to escape from the Beaux -
Arts type of master - plan composition.
His innovation is programatic. Hebrard tries to conceptualize the programm for
a city at the world scale, linked electronnically to all parts of the world. At the
center of its composition lies the "Tower of progress" from where journalists
from all over the world are sending the news of each scientific discovery found
in the city ( at a high productivity rate since the city would house the
international elite.).
We must not judge from the central idea of the project (which has more to do
with the spirit of the epoch than with Hebrard himself) that it is another utopian
city. It is, in fact, the contrary. Hebrard has a very pragmatic spirit and he
devotes a lot of attention to the planning of the circulation system. He looks for
the technology available for a rapid transit system. The circulation layout is a
refined system of avenues, turnarounds, water-canals and undergrounds.
The urban design reinforce the social segregation. The lower class residential
neighborhoods are spatially separated from the center of the town (where all the
monumental buildings, the great axis and the administration is housed) by a large
canal. These neighborhoods are planned to be self-sufficient environments with
their own theatre, museum, school and , of course, mairie.
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One can notice that Hebrard does nothing more than, in fact, systematize and
expands the principles that Haussmann had used in Paris - principles that could
not have been totally systematized in Paris. The projects that Hebrard designs are,
in essence , the city as Haussmann had seen it.
It is a city with lots of open spaces; an efficient city featuring the best
traffic system possible,infrastructure network (power station and treatment plan
for the town are centralized in one location.), a city which, in general, will use
the most advanced technologies. The city is transformed into a programm of
modern functions served by a rationnalized environment. It is also a town that
features an hierarchy of centers, creates a specialization of neighborhoods clearly
separated and organize spatially for social segragation. It is striking that the
programm for the neighborhood centers is so similar to the one planned by
Haussmann in the annexed parts of Paris.
The World city is symptomatic of what French urbanism will turn out to be
until very recently. The city is considered rationally as a program of several
functions which should be served by a spatial composition which should maximise
their interaction and additionally be "beautiful". If those requirements are worked
out the city should be a success and its inhabitants happy. Foucault spoke of
this kind of program: " (the programs) are rationally calculated prescriptions to
organize the institutions, to design space and to regulate behavior."(2)
This is precisely the task as formulated to Hebrard by the Gouverneur General
du Vietnam Maurice Long. Hebrard had to design the administrative reorganization
and the civic grandeur of the major towns of Vietnam. In addition Long wanted to
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design, in Dalat, a summer station where the Europeans could recuperate. Hebrard
was in charge of designing Dalat's detailed master plan as well as the
administrative buildings, the sport facilities and the housing. In Hanoi the project
was to restructure the administrative center: " The objective is to assemble all
the administrative functions to one point in a manneer suitable for a great
country " stated the Governor General. If the long term strategy of the governor
was to achieve the cooptation of the Vietnamese population to French values by
designing such an environment and intensifying education programs it was not
supported by all the colonial population. A hard-line tendency existed among the
colonials and was supported by the professional group of the Public Works
engineers formed in the " Grandes Ecoles" such as l'Ecole des Mines, l'Ecole
Polytechnique, l'Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees and l'ecole Militaire Superieure. ( It
is worth noticing that the sam Ecole des Ponts et -Chaussees and the Ecole
polytechnique provided, the former, the engineers, the latter the technocrats
responsible for the worst developments of the fifties and early sixties, in France.)
In any case, the divergence of views is well exemplified by the difference of
urbanisation as it happened in Saigon were the extremists colonials predominated
and in Hanoi were the central authority exerted a severe control since it was to
be the capital of the French administration. In Saigon a military engineer had
designed a plan for a town of 500,000 inhabitants unrelated to the economic
resources and the French population at the time that was characterised by an
approach featuring military control design decisions such as large avenues but
large open space. Moreover, in Saigon the speculation was so intense that it
ovewhhelmed any attempt to comply with aesthetic considerations.
In his pesonal attempts to design Hebrard showed more subtility and control.
His plans were generally structured on several zones of which he had defined 4
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types. The administrative center, the industrial sector, the recreationnal sector and
the residential sector. In order to meet his objectives Hebrar d worked out several
zoning codes which were resisted by the colonials. Hebrard wanted to master the
speculation and was criticized for this very reason. He attempted to use some
new techniques such as statistics to plan for the future industrial expansion,
project the need for sanitary installations and the like. Hebrard thought that he
could at least slow down, if not stop the speculation in the name of the general
interest.
A constant focus of Hebrard was to work at the centralization of the
administrative and governmental buildings to express spatially the presence of the
french model of centralized bureaucracy. In all his plans he pursued a second of
his objectives of the world-city, the rapid transit circulation system. He
implemented, in the 1920's, a network of tramways, paved the sreet with asphalt
in Saigon and Hanoi. Hebrard was very impressed by the- local architecture. He
even made a fairly large journey to see the great monuments of Indochina. He
hated the local European architects who persisted in constructing in the gothic
style. He favored a comprehensive approach to the local traditions which would
not be "pastiche", but would reinterprateate the native architecture through the
European culture.
In short, the contact between the races was judged as a good thing, onthe
condition that this contact would be organised, stratified and mediated by the
urban environment. Accordingly, an administrative reform was undertaken t o
integrate the local elites in the institutions.
PALACE OF THE
GOVERNOR IN
HANOI.
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1.3 H. Prost and Marocco.
Thanks to a stronger control over the regions of the Magrheb (North-Africa)
the achievements of French colonial urbanism in Marocco were realised at an even
larger scale; that is at the scale of national and regional planning.
In effect, the example of Marocco shows the case of a country whose
traditionnal urban and regional structure, although perfectly viable, was radically
transformed for the sole purpose of the french economic and military interest.
There was traditionnally four main centers in Marocco. Three of them were
located in the interior of the country ( Marrakech, Meknes and Fes) and one along
the coast ( Rabat-Sale). These cities had developed at a continuous pace and in a
relative harmony; the sultan settling in each of the towns for a year. This allowed
the town to keep a dominant place in their region for which they served as the
central market. In addition, Marrakech, Meknes and Fes were integrated in a larger
commercial network of international trade, since they were located on the road
through which all the goods from West - Africa were transported to Europe.
The crystallization of the administration in the town of Rabat-Sale in a typical
french bureaucratic and centralistic way and the development of existing and new
coastal towns disrupted the traditionnal regionnal equilibrium of the country.
To the traditionnal organization of the city, where each neighborhood was
autonomous and responsible for its maintenance, each merchant guild responsible
for its own souk (market) and each religious organisation responsible for the
maintenance of the mosquees and schools the french colonialism imposed the
municipality. For the Islamic law that allocated, to anyone, the right to freely use
of the street space for any activity and for any one to construct corbellings
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above the street; the French substituted the Code Napoleon that strictly prohibits
the rights enumerated above.
Finally, for a street network based on the circulation of camels; the french
substituted a urbanism based on vehicular circulation.
Although the first Europeans had settled in the Medina the first decision of the
Marechal Lyautey was to separate the Maroccan and European towns while
creating the latter at a distance from the former. Two reasons were provided for
this decision. Firstly this would preserve the cultural integrity of the Maroccans
and second, it would provide the space needed to design the modern towns the
europeans were seeking , with all the hygienic and spatial requirements necessary.
Contrary to what had been argued, Prost and Lyautey did not want to totally
segregate the new towns, but were in favor of a controlled assimilation of the
local elite and its settlement in the new towns - an idea that Hebrard had reused
in Indochinae.
In any case, Prost was the first urbanist to have ever planned on a larger
scale without constraints. Berlage in Amsterdam, R. Unwin in Hampstead for
instance had only worked on extension projects within exising towns only. Prost
not only had to plan a large urban complex but had to integrate it in a regional
scheme. Thank s to his Parisian contacts with the Musee Social, Prost was able
to write a set of regulations codifying the architecture, the zoning and the
standards (specifically for hygiene). All the municipalities had to establish a Plan
Directeur and to create the local service for the control and the enforcement of
the regulations (1914 decree). It was not easy to find the competent staff.
Moreover, the speculation had burst and was almost out of controll. Prost himsel
describes the situation of Casablanca in 1914 as an "incredible chaos" where the
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large estates constructed all over the place could have been, each " a possible
center for the new town " and where an active speculation had "greatly hindered
the action to which we ow the Casablanca of today.". The land prices were so
high that "lower income families had to group together to be able to build a
small house several kilometers from the center.". ()
In Casablanca the work of Prost was essentially to build the administrative
center and was the only place were he succeded in designing a " Beaux - Arts
ensemble", thanks to the use of the Zone Non - Aedificandi. This ensemble, the
place Lyautey regrouped the principal administration around a square. This square
served later as the prototype of the civic square in all the munic ipalities of
France. The rest of the town, in contrast, was built in a pretty chaotic manner.
In 1917, it already appeared to the authorities that they should plan a new
settlement for the rural migrants. Because of the war no credits were available
from the French governement so that a rather complicated financial package had
to be set up between the municipality, an islamic institution in charge of the
maintenance of the mosquees, the Habous, and the land was given by a wealthy
Jewish land owner. Prost gave the job to one of his closest collaborators,
Laprade. Laprades' approach to the medina was romantic and formalist. Although
he was extremely sensitive to the genius-loci and to the local architecture in
general, he adopted the attitude of an painter-architect rather than of an urban
planner. His approach fel short of understanding the cultural and economic needs
of a rural population as foreign as himself to the local kind of habitat. The new
medina was quickly unable to house all the incoming migration migration and was,
moreover, largerly housing the richer families of the old medina. Another
strategy was employed for the extension that consisted of 20 hectares of land
serviced by a grid system of roads and the infrastructure on which the population
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was allowed to construct themselves. ( The first site and service project? ). This
project was more successful in meeting the original objectives. However, the
French urbanism, in Marocco, essentially accomplished projects of the first type
rather than of the second.
The town of Rabat clearly illustrates this point. In Rabat a series of factors
had permitted the construction of formal projects. The direct control exerted on
the town by the authorities between 1929 and 1930 made possible the
construction, as planned, of all the administrative buildings. In terms of the
objectives fixed by Prost it was a success. He had meet his two principal goals :
To create a series of gardens inside the town and to bring the railroad to the
heart of the city. As Prost put it himself, the construction of modern facilities
and the design of the civic center were essential, the rest was secondary. This
realisation, however, had been conducted in a structural void, since all the
speculation had been artificially frozen. In the outskirts of Rabat and Casablanca,
however, Prost had "succeeded" in creating the terrible conditions that already
prevailed in the Parisian suburbs.
H. PROST. THE PLAN FOR RABAT.
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I The Paris suburbs: The urbanistic discours. The elaboration of
strategies. The implementation of a technocratic planning structure.
" Poor suburbs of Paris, doormats of the
city on which everyone wipes their shoes,
spits and passes through, who thinks of them?
No one. Overburdened with factories, cut up,in
rags, they are nothing but a souless country,
a damned workcamp, where smiling is useless
a wasted effort, suffering obscur, Paris,
"heart of France", what a joke! What an
advertising! Its suburbs all over that
collapse! Permanent martyrdom of hunger,
of work (...) Who pays attention to them?
No one of course. They are ugly and that's all"
Louis Ferdinand Celine,
Preface a Albert Sarouille, " Bezons a travers les ages"
Paris, Denoel,1944.
Celine's description of Paris suburbs is particularly evocative of what the
suburbian life had become by 1944. I have already described how the policy of
"laisser-faire" had characterised the authories' behavior during the 1914-1944
period. In this chapter I will therefore discuss the different strategies of
intervention which were conceptualised at this epoch. This is of interest to us
because these schemes were similar, in essence, ( and in structure of
implementation ) to the plans adopted, in 1965, for region of Paris.
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In 1944, it is not exaggerating to say that Paris had found again, in the
suburbs, its Feaubourgs of the pre - Haussmmann period. The incapacity of the
authorities to react to this situation might be explained by four factors:
1- The atmosphere was still affected by a negative reaction to Haussmanns'
public works. ( influence of associations for the conservation of Paris.)
2- The political class in general was not much interested in the suburbs.
Prehaps all the attention (and the money) was turned into the colonies.
3- Even if they had wanted to implement a global plan in the suburbs the
authorities would have had to deal with a number of 'difficult' municipalities.
4- To perform such a task required the building of a political consensus which
was not an easy task.
5- No one really knew how to plan such a large and complex agglomeration.
In fact, it seems that this period served essentially to respond to these
questions. The politico-administrative sphere, the architects, the economic leaders
proceeded to exchange ideas, information, proposals to ultimately arrive at some
sort of concensus. If the war had not happen, would these theories have been
concretized? I would tend to think so. It is significatant that major urban planning
research continued during the war and that the Vichy government had
promulgated in 1943 the 'Charte de l'Urbanisme'.
The problem of the suburbs could not have been ignored too long. For the
political class they were a social and economic chaos, for the ' Avant-Garde '
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architects a spatial and visual one. Between the political class and the modern
architects began a marriage of interest.
The analysis of the progressive politicians begins with a horrified discovery:
(the suburbs) are the result of the multiplication of unplanned developments where
no gas, electricity, water or sewer service is provided (...) Where will the parks be
if no land is reserved today for such a use? (...) Without a subsequent plan for the
future there is no economically feasible maintenance, no comfort and no beauty
for our large cities." ( 4)
This analysis of G. Risler (a public administrator who, incidentally had a great
influence on Hebrard) is typical of the athmosphere that prevailed in the public
among the public authorities who, ultimately, in March 1919,voted for the law
Cornudet that made it compulsory for each municipality to draft a development
plan. From the first competition for an extension scheme of Paris in 1919 to the
application decree voted as a result of the ' plan Prost ' in 1932, a policy of
urbanism of the Paris agglomeration slowly emerged.
On the field, however, only the speculators and the private developers are
active. It seemed that the proficiency of great schemes and concepts elaborated
in the public realm was inversely proportionnal to the capacity of the goernement
to actually implement any sort of operation. In fact, it is the more vague but
grandiose and visionnary concept which will gain a broad consensus: " Le Plus
Grand Paris." (litterarly the largest Paris).
F. Latour, the first to formulate the idea justificates it in relation to subjective
concepts and symbolic imagery: " (...) I doubt that the capital of Elegance and
Good Taste can, without damage, remain encircled by sordid settlements and the
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noxious zone." (5). As Latour asks for a" dictator of the Paris region" his idea is
carried out in a number of official periodicals. One of these periodicals, ' Le
Grand Paris ' essentially focuses on the administrative set up that the realisation
of such a concept requires, leaving totally the architectural dimension. ' Le Grand
Paris ' argues in favor of the unity of the region beyond the particularism ( that
is, their autonomy ) of the communes.
A more elaborated version of the ' Grand Paris ' concept proposed by another
official, Guerard, is particularly evocative of the official state of mind in regard
to the suburbs. Their restructuration can only be succeed if there is tight control
and an important direct participation of the state in the process. Guerards'
proposal is to transform the Paris agglomeration into a "French Washington"
where all the principal functions and administrations of the central state would be
scattered all over the suburbs. (6)
Although this idea is perfectly consistent with the concept of centralism (it
just proposes a change of scale of the center), it is opposed by a second
"reflex", complementary to the first, which is the "crystallization" of the centre.
The "crystallized" center had remained stable until Haussmann dramatically
changed its scale. Perhaps it was too early (on the scale of history) to expand it
again. It might be true that cities have to take some time to recover from their
mutations and restructure themselves. In any case, the proposal of Guerard was
not, at that time, considered.
In fact, it is only the industries that the authorities will agree to
deconcentrate. "Since we all agree that Paris, capital of Elegance, should not be
polluted by noxious fumes; it is legitimate to consider the industry as the
enemy." But there is another kind of pollution that it is urgent to deal with: " In
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addition to these aesthetic considerations we must worry of the socio - political
aspects of this situation, which are rather depressing: when one thinks of the
enormous influence that Paris exerts in both moral and material terms; one can
seriously worry at seeing see the capital encircled by the "red belt". There is,
however, a possible solution: " The medication against the red belt it is not the
repression, nor is it the restriction, but it is the betterment (...) all of this can be
translated in terms of urbanism; Let's transform the red belt into a green beltt61ln
this declaration the political nature of the urban scheme is clearly expressed. The
aim of the plan is not to better the living conditions of the working class, per-se,
but to avoid that the terrible conditions of the suburbs tranform " the little estate
owner in a revolter against the social order." (7)
The mythical vision of Paris as the capital (of France, of Elegance, etc, ) the
broad vision of the Grand Paris, the obsession with a close control and
preponderant participation of the state over any redevelopment process of the
Paris region, will significantly complicate the task of the authorities to formalize
and implement a scheme. The decision will only be taken when a strong leader
will cut short the endless debates. This leader will be De Gaulle, and the time
1965. One can evaluate the amount of time lost in the process. This structural
hesitation of the authorities is very well explained by the following analysis of
M. Crozier of the " intellectual climate" of France before the sixties: " In French
bourgeois society (...) the problems posed by change is responded to by an ever
increasing centralization of institutions and of the system of social relations. As
a consequence, a change in any part of the whole, even a minor one, really
challenged the general equilibrium of society. (...) The successive steps of action
are clearly seen but they are understood much more in a historical sense than in
a prospective sense. More emphasis is placed on material determinism than on
the mechanism of change of action or change.(...) Ends are discussed in relation to
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moral and religious principles, and means are analyzed in a mechanistic
perspective. They deal only with ideal functioning, the one best way, and refuse
to take into account the role of the independant human element on which they
must rely.(...) Substantive issues have thus to be dealt within such an intransigent
way that they cannot be well understood, and one cannot either resolve them or
make them advance in a rational way."(S)
The only consensus gained in the Thirties was on the technocratic nature of
the organization to be charge of the planning of the Paris region. All political
parties ( with the exception of the communist party which had an obvious interest
in retaining the integrity of independence of the municipalities) agreed on the
need of setting up a special body, directly related to the state that would take all
the responsabilties in setting up the Paris regional plan. The Comite Superieur de
l'Amenagement et de l'Organisation de la Region Parisienne replaced in June 1928
the Conseil General de la Seine. Thus, the elected officials were replaced by
technocrats of the central administrations of of the state, as the planners of the
future of the Paris region.
REVUE MENSUELLE ILLWSMI~ DACTON 2 Pnom M*VVM o
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LE GRAND PARIS: A PERIODICAL FOR URBAN 'ACTION'.
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CHAPTER IV
PLANNING IN THE POST WAR ERA.
Introduction
The policy of Haussmann had achieved what it intended to do. It is a model
which is still praised ( or attacked ) today by many planners. However, as with
almost any urban (or,largerly,economic) strategy the solution contains the seeds of
-another problem. The suburbs began to develop themselves at an unprecedented
rate and we have seen that the following governments were incapable of
undertaking a subsequent strategy. The result, in the suburbs, is catastrophic. At
the national scale it will increase dramatically the economic imbalance between
Paris and the Region. Paris attraction became absolute because all the national
railway and all the road networks converged in in Paris. In Paris were
concentrated all the industries and all the intellectual forces of France. This, in
turn, was another reason for more industries to locate in the Paris region-that is,
close to the place where scientific discoveries were made and where a host of
small size entreprises were located that could handle intermediary jobs. Wealth in
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the Paris region was much higher than anywhere else in France; the wages were
three times greater. This fact alone was enough of a motivation to attract all the
skilled labor of France to Paris. This fact was again another reason for the
industries to locate themselves in the Paris region. This circular movement is
responsible for the unprecedented rural exodus that France experienced. At the
same time several regions of France began to dramatic ally decline. The people
were not only attracted to Paris because of the wages but also because of the
incredible fame of "Paris, the City of lights". The lights of the "confort urbain"
and of Paris' intellectual life.
I The reconstruction.
1.1 The Political Situation
After the war, until 1954, when De Gaulle returns to power a series of
unstable governments took office. This unstability was caused by the structure of
the 'Parliamentary regime'; that is a regime where the assemblies (the Legislative
power) had more power than the governement (the Executive). This causedthe
governements to change as quickly as the alliance between the political parties
would shift. As De Gaulle came back into power, he changed this situation by
drafting a new constitution for the Fifth Republic that created a situation of
"Presidential regime" where the power was, in effect, in the hands of the
Executive, that is the government. The president replaced the prime minister as
the leading figure of the government. Moreover, in a characteristic Gaullist
conception the prime minister was the head of the political majority, while the
president was the head of all the French. In defining this role of the president,
De Gaulle was actually renewing the tradition of the charismatic leaders of France.
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A tradition of leaders (Grands Hommes) that had come to power at crucial times
of French history to save the country from dismemberment. Indeed, this kind of
ruler managed France above the corporate interest and the political factions This
might explain, in part, why no plan for the Paris region had been implemented
before the 1965 plan. Indeed, the Paris region was ,in essence , a politically very
difficult region to restructure. One could say that it really took all the power of
De Gaulle to effectively launch a plan for the Paris region. However, other factors
had played an important role. In effect, two reasons were pleading for a quick
reorganisation of the French economic base. The first one was obviously to
recover from the damages created by the war. The second one was to take care
of the delay in the industrial development accumulated during the war and the
physical destruction of several cities.
1-2 The economic situation and shifts in planning theory.
The reconstruction and the modernization of France was felt as the first
priority. The problems that its own expansion had caused to Paris were consisered
a less urgent task that could be tackled later. In any cases, the reconstruction
efforts were carried out at the Liberation, were carried out by the ' Delegation a
l'Equipement National' which then included a smaller body called the ' Service a
l'Amenagement du Territoire '. This service would later become more important
as the ' Ministere de la Reconstruction. The Reconstruction efforts did not focus
on Paris which had been saved, whereas several cities had been totally destroyed
by the bombardements and were reconstructed between 1947 and 1960. Two
famous reconstructions of this kind are the one of Saint-Malo under the direction
of the architect Louis Arretche and Le Havre under the direction of the architect
Auguste Perret. However, a second element made the reconstruction efforts even
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more urgent. After the war the country was facing a baby-boom. This phenomena
was not due to the end of the war ( as it was first thought ) since this trend was
repeated in 1947 and 1948. In fact, the explanation of this phenomena laid in the
effect of the family legislation adopted in 1939 which provided financial
incentives for larger families. At the same time France was witnessing a
demographic rejunevation. Consequently, France had to undertake a serious effort
of economic rejunevation. Jean Monet, as he was presenting the report for the
plan in 1946, stigmatized the situation in the formula : "Modernization or
Decadence". For the first time a coherent industrial plan supported by a massive
involvement of the administration and a subsequent financial strategy had been
developed. This effort was coupled with a sensitivity for a better geographical
equilibrium of economic activities. Between 1945 and 1950 the first elements of a
policy of "Amenagement du territoire" began to emerge. Such a policy was a
breakthrough and had never been attempted before the war. Although no plan had
been drafted for the Paris region, its expansion was envisionned in a very new
fashion. The idea of its infinite expansion began to be seriously questionned. The
example of the importance of London relative to the rest of England served as a
reference. A. Demangeon, in his monograph of Paris, was very typically asking
the question: "Is it good that this collosal town expand forever,attracting new
inhabitants from all over the country ? ". In fact, this reversal of attitude came
from the studies of a research group, composed mainly of technicians, who had
worked, during the war at the 'Delegation Generale de I'Equipement National'.
These researchers had documented some of the disparities of French regional
development. These disparities became even more evident with the publication of
a book written originally as a report for the ' Ministere de la Reconstruction et
de I'Urbanisme by a geographer : J.F.Gravier. The book " Paris et le Desert
Francais" was a virulent essay against the centralization of France in Paris and
the resulting decline of the Frenchregions. Its tone was provocative:
I
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(...) So, in all the domains, the Paris region has acted,
since 1850, not as a metropole irrigating its backcountry, but
as a monopolistic group eating the national substance. The
region of Paris multiplies, in the regions, the consequences
of the first industrial revolution and sterilize most of the
provincial economies (...). Paris has confiscated all the
decision centers, all the conception centers, all the major
activities and left to the rest of France the subordinnate
activities. This relation of dependance is really a feature
of a colonial regime. ()
Three years later,Eugene Claudius Petit, the minister of reconstruction and
urbanism enunciated a significant policy in a brochure appropriately named " For a
National Plan of the Territory ". The brochur argued for a national plan that would
improve the distribution of the population of the country in relation to its
resources. It called for the decentralization of new and expanding industries in
regional centers as well as an even repartition of the universities and other public
cultural facilities. Ultimately, the manifesto of J.F.Gravier and the Claudius-Petit
marked the. first reversal in the attitude of the administration towards urban and
regional development. A number of actions were then taken such as the creation
of a "National Fund for the Amenagement of the territory". However, the
administration was resilient to the establishment of an effectively decentralized
policy. In fact, all the changes were controlled and administrated by the
technocracy with very little input from local officials and no consultation of the
residents of the interested regions.
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The need for decentralization was very real. If the expansion of several
sectors of the economy had permitted sizeable increases in the populations of
middle sized towns such as Saint - Etienne, Lille, Nantes, Bordeaux and Toulouse,
in the first part of the century, and increases for Dijon, Reims, Grenoble and
Clermont-Ferrand in the second half of the century, the bulk of the nation's
economic activities remained concentrated in Paris, Lyon, Marseille - the three
largest cities. The structure of France urban pattern,however,did not imply such a
concentration. On the contrary, it was characterized by a great number of urban
settlements linked together by very well developed road and railroad system.
However,if this network was leaving sarcely a corner of the country remote, it
essentially consisted of large number of small sized roads and railroads that
could only be used for people commuting and not for extensive industrial freight.
This last type of activity was only possible along the very scarce main axes of
circulation which divided economic France into two parts. The dividingline was
drawn from the mouth of Seine ( Le Havre ) to the mouth of the Saone - Rhone
river basins ( Marseille ) . Most of French industrial activity was located on one
side of the line that is the North, the East, the Rhone valley and the
Mediterranean coast. These selective developments were rather logic since the
east and the north had superior primary resources as well as a larger market with
the foreign peripherical region, themselves very well developed. The Rhone Valley
was the natural link between the north and the south (others path were
unpraticable because of the two major mountains chaines in either side of the
valley:the Massif Central and the Alpes.). The cities on the mediterranean coast
had prospered since Antiquity thanks go the extensive trade with other cities of
the meditteranean sea. They had always been an important link in the commercial
exchange between the Occident and the Orient. Some activity had developed on
the other side of the line but it had never reached more than minor growth.
"Excluding Paris, cities of 100,000 or more west of the Le Havre-Marseille
I
PAGE 67
diagonal had about half of the population of equivalent cities in on the other side
of the line; with the inclusion of Paris the ratio dropped to one to six." (2)
However, the growth of the wealthy regions themselves was offset by the one of
the Paris region within the Seine Basin. "In 1861, this region had accounted for
one out of every thirteen persons in France , by 1962 it contained one out every
5.5 Frenchmen" (3). This expansion was not surprising. Paris had been the political
and administrative center of France since the Middle-Ages. The 18 Century had
crystallized all of the French intellectual and artistic world within its territory. The
second empire with Haussmann had transformed the city into an economic tool
which had successfully attracted both the enterprises and the labor force. Finally,
the July Monarchy had designed the Paris centered railroad system that would
multiply all the preceding factors. The only east-west tranversal of the railroad
network was not a decision of its designer,the engineer Jean-Baptiste Legrand but
was a concession obtained by the author Lamartine (then also a deputy) after a
particularly violent campain in the National Assembly. The dominance of Paris
resulted in an increasingly substantial population loss for the rest of the nation:
11BY the end of World war ll,the vast majority of the eigthy-nine departments in
metropolitan France were experiencing a decided decline in population. This
marked the culmination of a century-old trend: from 1831 to 1862, the number of
such departments had risen from 0 to 33; by 1901 the number had risen to 45;
and by 1946 it had reached 71" (4).
Il Planification of Paris in the Fities. The First Schemes.
The first draft of the Paris plan was presented in 1950. A committee studied
its more controversial elements and presented a report to the council in
December 1951. Its proposals were mainly concerned with ensuring the easy
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movement of wheeled vehicles over the next hundred years. Other fundamental
elements were the reconstruction of Les Halles on the same site and the creation
of a business district to the north of the right bank's center. Otherwise, the right
bank center was little affected. The artistic importance of Le Marais was
recognized. No street improvement of this neighborhood was planned since it
would have resulted in the destruction of most of the greatest aristocratic hotels
of the area ( The hotels were concentrated along the potential new circulation axis
) . The proposal was heavily criticized because of the extensive demolitions and
its failure to provide new buidings to replace them. In any case, the proposal was
firstly too ambitious , secondly the proposed scheme was very unlikely to make
a major contribution to the traffic problem. Its rejection trigerred a brand new
approach to the problems of the center. In 1952, several councelors presented a
report calling for the the improvement of the traffic flow by the decongestion of
the center. They wanted to see parking restrictions imposed, parking lots and
pedestrian subways built the railway terminal moved to the outskirts, an express
metro constructed and the Halles decentralized to the suburbs. Although the city
authorities themselves were begining to shift towards decentralization, the city
council approved in 1953 the second part of a development plan. This decision,
however was purely academic since considerable delays were expected for its
implementation due to a lack of funds. Meanwhile, the city and the government
were studying new strategiesto reduce the pressure on the city instead of
attempting to meet ever increasing demands. This lead to the study of a plan at
the regional scale.
IlIl The First Regional Plan: The P.A.D.O.G.
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The recognition of the problem caused by the lagging regions and the
development pressure in Paris and its suburbs caused a dramatic revision in the
scenarios to be adopted in the future national plans. It was clear, however, that
any new policy objectives had to be carefully balanced with the need to foster
maximum growth for the nation -an objective in which Paris still had to play a
predominant part. A second problem was that, in the postwar period, there were
no instruments to conduct a policy of industrial relocation or to control the land
for restructurations. All the tools had to be invented. It is the Mendes-France
government, elected in 1954, that was the first to take a firm stand for
decentralization. In September 1954, a law created a fund to facilitate the
adaptation of industry and the industrial decentralization." More importantly, a law
of January 1955 made it compulsory to obtain a permit from the municipality,
before the building of any industrial plot of more than 500 square meters of
surface in the Paris region. The next governement, the Edgard - Faure government,
voted a number of even more ambitious laws that, notably, created the "Society
of Regional Development"(S.D.R.). These institutions acted as banks whose specific
aims would be to finance the economic development of the regions. Another
essential part of the law was the related installation of the "Programs for
Regional development". The Ministry of Finance,however,refused to subsidize
these programs. There principal interest actually lay in the fact that they defined
specific territories that became the 22 current administrative regions. As these
actions towards th e economic decentralization of France were launched, the
investment activity remained seriously depressed.
What was clearly needed in the 1950's was the study of a new comprehensive
global plan for the entire Paris region. In effect, the population had continue to
grow when no effort had been made to give to the region the facilities it
desesperatly needed. Then, in 1958, a group within the Ministry of the
Reconstruction quickly drafted a plan called the Plan d'Amenagement et
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d'Organisation Generale de la Region Parisienne ( P.A.D.O.G.). The plan dealt with
general principles but included no study on costs or staging.
Between 1958 and 1962, the ministry of construction, Pierre Sudreau, took up a
number of actions in favor of Paris decentralization. He created the Institut
d'Amenagement et d'Urbanisme de la Region Parisienne,a special organisation of
planners and architects that would study and carry out metropolitan planning
strategies for the Paris region. It is in a context favorable to the decentralization
of Paris that the P.A.D.O.G. was approved by decree in August 1960, as an interim
plan for the years 1960-1970. The philosophy of the P.A.D.O.G. was close to the
one at the basis of the English experience and was, in fact, largerly inspired by
the Greater London Plan. The P.A.D.O.G. had several major goals: The first one
was the stabilization of Paris. In order to achieve this objective it was proposed
to reduce the growth migration to 50,000 a year ( a cut of 50,000- to 80,000 of
the annual volume of migration for the 1955-1960 period ).This would limit the
growth of Paris to 100 ,000 a year and keep the total 1970 population of the
region at 9.4 millions. A second major objective of the plan was to restructure
the suburbs of Paris which had been widely urbanized since the second empire
and for which no plan had been studied (except for the Prost plan of 1934). It is
in this area that the need for a important restructuration was the greatest. If the
slums of the Zone had disappeared ten years ago, the structural problems of the
suburbs had not been yet tackled. Once again, the official reaction was to create
a green belt to aerate the fabric and control development. The second part of the
strategy was to develop four principal and eight secondary nodes to revitalize the
suburbs. These nodes would provide the suburbs with the facilities, the housing
and the transportation network they missed. These nodes, it was believed would
give the necessary "push" that would foster economic development in these
depressed areas. A third major point of the plan was to develop a series of
new-towns outside the influence area of Paris. These new towns would alleviate
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the development pressure from Paris and its suburbs, making possible, namely,
the creation of the green belt. Therefore, the new towns were planned to
reinforce the economic development of the ring of existing secondary towns
located within a range of 60 Kilometers from Paris. A last point of the plan was
to divide the region of Paris into zones within which a specific range of taxes
and premiums was used to encourage or discourage the location of industrial and
commercial activity. In addition, a number of industrial areas and substantial
subsidies programs were planned to effectively influence the relocation of
entreprises. It is important to understand, however, that the planners always
thought that they would have to accomodate the planned poulation growth within
the existing conurbation - even if the P.A.D.O.G was a major effort to alleviate
this growth in the future. The new nodes, in a sense, were planned to take
accomodate the first wave of growth to come (relieving Paris center from more
pressure and disturbance ) while the effects of the new towns was not believed
to be instrumental before a more distant future. It is in this perspective, that one
can understand the development of the ' La Defense ' operation which was
located at the fringe of Paris and at the termination of the great perspective of
the Tuileries. La Defense was a large complex of office towers, very similar to
what was developing in the U.S.A.. The idea of the planners was to displace the
construction of office towers outside of the city. An essential feature of the plan
was to link the new nodes together with an adequate transportation system, based
on a radiating network of motorways. A new express metro system (to be
connected with existing railway lines) would provide rapid transit throughout the
region and revitalize some of the more distant suburbs.
In short, the P.A.D.O.G. represented a policy of limitation of growth combined
with the greatest possible measures to improve the services, equipment and
amenities for those who would continue to live and work in the Paris region. The
Ministry's official brochure on the P.A.D.O.G. stressed that the plan had the double
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task of establishing a balance betwen Paris and the provinces and of improving
the living and working conditions inside the Paris region itself.
Fig. 10
HYPOTHESE (NON RETENUE) DE VILLES NOUVELLES
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THE PARIS NEWTOWNS IMPLEMENTATION PROSED BY THE P.A.D.O.G.
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IV Planning in the Sixties: The Gaullist Plan of the Paris Region.
In conjunction with the urban policies enumerated in the Fifth plan a very
ambitious plan was to be carried out in the Paris region. The plan had been
studied by different agencies under the guidance of the newly created District de
la Region de Paris. The district paralleled the current responsible agencies for the
Paris region to ,in fact, short-circuit them and facilitate the delivery of the
programs and the implementation of the plan.( This strategy, incidentaly, is very
similar to the one adopted in Boston by mayor Collins with the creation of the
B.R.A. ).
The District supervisor was Paul Delouvrier a man who had the confidence of
De Gaulle who had previously sent him in Constantine ( Algeria ) to manage there
a very large housing plan. When Delouvrier meets De Gaulle to discuss the
strategies for the Paris region; he is given the lapidary instructions: "It is
important politically for France that Paris regains the image of a modern city.
Order must be made in there." De Gaulle knows that "something must be done,
but he does not know what. In any cases, the Schema Directeur d'Amenagement
et d'Urbanisme (S.D.A.U.) was published in 1965 and approved in 1968. The S.D.A.U.
rejected and denied the strategy advocated in the previous plan ,the P.A.D.O.G..
The idea of relieving the long term growth from the region and to divide it
between the peripherical secondary towns and manage the middle term growth
was judged as a retrograde,possibly Malthusianist approach. On the contrary, the
plan proposed to accomodate all the expansion to come within the conurbation
and to enhance the modern scale of Paris as one of the leading international
metropolis. The only concession to the Paris centered growth was the provision
of the Equilbrium Metropolis and the Development Corridors of the Seine and of
the Rhone (with the Rhone-Rhin linkage project). But, even the plan for the Seine
development corridor was marked by Parisian egocentrism: The S.D.A.U. does not
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define a Parisian region closed on herself but (...) projects towards Rouen and the
sea (...) the directions in which (...) Paris, if it is needed, will advance." (5) This
language, one might say, is almost a 'colonialist' language. In any cases, it is
doubtless that the development corridors were profitable inthe first instance, to
the three major cities: Paris,Lyon and Marseille. In fact, the S.D.A.U. took its
place inthe series of decisions that had favored Paris during history.
Consequently, the rational behind the plan was seriously biased by a realm of
politico-symbolic gestures in which Paris had an incredible value. Indeed, the plan
( as well as the way it had been drafted and carried out) was very reminiscent to
what had happened under the Second Empire. The concept of "Grand Design" was
back again as well as the set of conditions necessary to carry it out: a great
political leader, a strong regime and an expanding economy. Even the special
relationship between the political leader and the 'maitre d oeuvre' was replicated.
In effect, one can say that Delouvrier was De Gaulle's Haussmann without being
far from truth. Unlike the P.A.D.O.G., the S.D.A.U. was not an ordinary document
with legal value but an "instrument of orientation" for administrative action. This
allowed for an extreme vagueness of the details of implementation, particularly
for financing. It also gave the maximum leeway in its interpretation when those
responsible had to defend it against the criticism of its opponents. This might
also explains its literary rather than factual content. Montaigne, Peguy and Valery
are cited. But the most significant quote is the one of the ancient greek author
Seneque which was dramatically placed on the front page: "It is not because
things are difficult that we do not dare, it is because we do not dare that things
are difficult". (1) This quote gives the dimension of the development to come.
And, indeed, the plan is not the product of a narrow mind! The description of
the objectives of the S.D.A.U. by Llyod Rodwin in his book 'City and Nations is
particularly evocative of the dimensions of the scheme: " ... It proposed ( the
S.D.A.U. ) a variety of innovations for the Paris region : three regional railway
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express lines, ten principal radial highways plus secondary auto routes, three ring
roads, the provision of essential utilities and community services in the outers
areas and a major effort to change the form of the city by stressing east-west
linear travel networks and growth patterns to reduce the traffic bottlenecks
created by the older system. The plan sought to relieve population pressure by
accomodating families in the outer city and in eight self-contained new towns,
each serving about 300,000 to 500,000 people. The bulk of these ideas was
incorporated in the Fifth plan. (...) The Schema Directeur did not spell out costs,
priorities, or means. But one measure of the straggering sums involved was that
the estimated cost for the building of the metros and highways alone ranged from
20 million to 100 million francs ($5 million to $20 million by kilometer)" (6)
In order to offset the fuzzyness of the study, the plan needed a
strongargument. Hence, all the dialectic effort of the S.D.A.U. was concentrated
in the prevision of growth of the population from 8.5 millions in the mid-sixties
to "14 millions inhabitants of the Paris region at the year 2000." This was based
on a population growth of 150,000 per year over the previous twenty years and
of 135,000 per year between 1954 and 1962. Of this approximatively 50,000
represented natural increase and 85,000 immigration. Even if immigration was
stopped ,the population of Paris would reach 11 million in 1985 based on these
assumptions. To stop migration of its population over the next twenty years the
regions had to receive at least 60% of all new industrial jobs.
These scenarios,however,were based on the assumption that the expansion
would exclusively take place in the cities. The projected growth of Paris was
calculated in comparision to urban France and represented an increase superior to
the national average. The statement that " For the Paris region not to double
before the end of the century, the totality of all the other towns of France should
double." (3) did not take in account the possibility of development of the rural
districts and of the small towns, although this had been the case in others
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countries of Europe such as Germany and England. The British experience, for
instance, was ignored or even travestied in the plan. The fact that the London
agglomeration was, then, less populated than before the war was not mentionned.
Instead, the numbers to which the plan referred to as the ones of the
agglomeration of London corresponded, in fact, to the South-West of England.
It might well have been, in the thinking of the authors of the S.D.A.U. , that,
one cannot launch such an ambitious project without frightening the public and
thus 'manipulate' the numbers. But, if it was not on the basis of accurate
projections; what was the force that did actually moved the system to implement
such a difficult plan?
I will suggest a number of reasons. Firstly, there was a real preoccupation for
the future of France. This was a real obssession for someone like De Gaulle,
whose sincere and uninterested commitment to France was unquestionnable. Yet,
we know that, even though he was not interested in the details of the project, De
Gaulle was the one that ultimately decided its form and scale. What is then the
scale at which someone like De Gaulle thinks? It is the historical scale. His
judgement and appreciation of Frances' relative position in the future world is
based from the perspective of events such as Yalta. Yalta had been the traumatic
lesson that taught De Gaulle that France could ultimately stop being one of the
great nations of the world. And if there was one thing on which De Gaulle would
not compromise it was " la grandeur de la France". In face of this perspective,
of this terrible certitude that France could eventually become a secondary country
unaccuratenumbers had littleimportance What does the year 2000 represents other
than a symbolic time, a point intime when symbolic time, a point when France
will have to have 'meet the challenge'of the modern world. The numbers
projected for the year 2000 are not correct? They will be true 25 of 50 years
later. At the scale of history this does not really matter. And if the population
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is not there by this time, living in a powerful and organized metropolis, that
certainly means that France " has lost her appointement with the future " that it
had become a minor country of the modern world. This absolute vision of the
modern world and of the need to modernize France by any means ( that is to
construct "American highways", American office space zones, American
supemarkets, modern housing projects and the like) is very well expressed in this
citation of P.Delouvrier "The France of 100 million inhabitants was dwelling in him
De Gaulle ) : I was fitting in his views."
These views, in any case, were placed by the authors of the S.D.A.U. in the
realm of historical continuity. They emphasized the permanence, over time,of Paris
as the center of France: " Celtic village, roman borough, town of the Kings that
assembled France, capital of the state (...), common fatherland of the French and
one of the prominent good of all men of this planet, Paris has already gone
through 20 centuries (...). There is a permanence of Paris in its spirit and soul, a
permanence of Paris "France of France". There should not exist a plan that fails
to recognize this past and this permanence. The S.D.A.U. came at a point of
recommencement of which the story of Paris is staked out(l)The S.D.A.U. also
insists on the permanence of the functions of Paris: " Very early, a large town -
since the Middle-Ages by far the largest townof France and for long the largest
town of Europe - (...) Paris has always exercised four important functions: Paris
political capital of the country, mother of university, religious center and merchant
town."(6) The plan then argued that, although the functions of university and
religious center are not being questionned, the function of comercial center is
endengered by national competition. In terms of the function of Paris as the
political capital, the authors of the S.D.A.U. explain that it only has been
questionned by "some Parisian political personalities that wished to have a mayor
in Paris." or by "some fervent regionnalist that believe that to decentralize the
capital would activate the decentralization, or by some lover of new capital in the
I
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fields." On the contrary, the authors of the S.D.A.U. argued that Paris should
become " the living heart of the region and of the agglomeration in its new
dimensions.". The new scale of the region did not imply by any means "...the
immobilism of Paris intra-muros." This was "out of the question". Why? Because
the ultimate goals of the S.D.A.U. were to multiply by three the role of Paris as a
central place: "Paris will give to itself the means to play, in accordance with the
needs of the end of the century, the following roles: 1- Its irreplaceable role of
heart of the urban region in its totality. 2- Its unique vocation as the political,
cultural and economical capital. 3- Its shared mission of European and Worldwide
metropolis.
" So that Paris intra-muros, city more essential, will remain the most complete
town of the world.". It is the Paris region in its totality, revolving around its
ancient but renewed nucleus, that becomes, once more , the symbolic center of
France: " So after the Civitas Parisorium, after the medieval town, after the
'Grande Ville' of the Enlightment, after the agglomeration of the industrial era (...)
we witness everyday the formation of the urban region of Paris." (u
In effect, a number of operations were carried out in Paris intra-muros.
These restructurations resulted in the destruction of entire neighborhoods of Paris,
namely in the 13, 15 and 20th Arrondissements which correspond to the territory
that Haussmann had integrated into the city in 1861. These neighborhoods, which
were one of the most essential elements of the plans of Haussmann were not
considered to merit any effort of preservation as opposed to the Arrondissements
of the historical core. A part of the question of the quality of their architecture,
the inner ring and outer ring Arrondissements were different by their social
composition :
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the former were inhabited by the higher social classes whereas the outer ring
Arrondissements essentially housed the middle and lower middle class. This
circumstance should probably be also taken in account to understand why the
restructuration of Paris systematically avoided the center but focused extensively
in the outer ring Arrondissements.
In any case, a cheap imitation of american high-rises began to replace the
traditionally low-rise fabric built until then. These new buildings not only
destroyed the silhouette of the neighborhoods but they destroyed the spatial
organisation and life, the sens of street, the mixed use housing commerceetc. In
short, they destroyed a skillfully designed environment, perfectly suitable, for the
development of neighborhood life for the sake of building a modern environment
which provoked the disruption of scale and destructuration of neighborhood life .
The restructuration of the peripheral neighborhoods essentially consisted of
housing projects since the development of facilities occured in selected locations
such as La Defense, le Front de Seine, etc. This means that none of the
productive investment was ,in fact, geared to these areas that were to become
dormitory cities under the conjonction of the physical destruction of their
commercial base and the lack of investment to replace it. If this result was,
maybe, not intentionnal in the planners strategy it was , I think, imbedded in their
conception of modernity and their notion that some arrondissements deserved the
bulk of the investments while the others had to serve as housing areas for the
former. In any case, three operations were especially significant of this
dichotomic view and of this strategy of concentration of investment.
The first and more important one was the one that had began with the P.A.D.O.G
the office complex of La Defense which was to be carried out and even
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enlarged with the S.D.A.U.. Interestingly, the site of La Defense was chosen late r
by the French director Jacques Tati as the setting of his movie "Playtime" which
depicted the quest of a group of american tourists -lost in an 'americanized'
environment- for the "real Paris". Tati was ironic about the absurdity of such an
environment where typical French characters of the lower social groups seemed
ridiculously displaced as they attempted to live and work in an environment that
tenuously resisted them. But the more acute of Tati's critics was perhaps reserved
to the higher class of office employees that was (with various degrees of
success) attempting to intergrate this "modern" environment and its new laws.
The object of the entire movie was obviously to warn the public of the risk of
losing the essence of French spirit if a modernization policy of the environment
and the society would be further(and blindly)developed. This message was
eventually well understood by a large fraction of the french society and ,in fact,
further developed during the events of May 1968. These changes in the public
thinking towards the problems of urbanization and architecture eventually
prompted the new 'environmentalist' policy of Giscard of which I shall talk later.
Three other such nodes of development were programed in Paris. The "Front
de Seine" operation was developed along the river in an area adjacent to the site
of the Tour Eiffel. Initially, it was planned to later develop a similar operation in
the other side of the Seine which was almost entirely stopped because of the
increasing resistance that such projects were to encounter. The part that got built,
however, featured a "Manhattan-like" skyline with corporate office towers, an
international hotel, a small number of expensive apartments in high - rises; the
ensemble resting on a pedestrian slab under which was located the parking silos.
In short, it was a miniature replication of the La Defense project on a smaller
scale and with a hotel and some fancier shops, due to its central location.
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Another similar project had been developed as the restructuration of the
Montparnasse railway station took place. At the same time,
on some fields remained unused by the new station,a complex was developed
that would feature the highest building in Paris: the Montparnnasse office tower.
The project construction began in 1975, even though it was strongly opposed by a
large number of people who argued that it would destroy a number of the main
vistas of Paris namely the Trocadero, Tour Eiffel and Invalides perspective in
which the tower would be higly visible. The last node to be planned within Paris
was Les Halles. The old market was displaced to Rungis and the center of the
new regional metro system (R.E.R.) that would link the projected new towns was
placed there.The question of what to plan on the surface arose. The first plan
presented by the by the Atelier Public d'URbanisme de la ville de Paris ( Paris'
planning agency ) was to develop a'World Trade Center' that would give to Paris
a facility equivalent to what the other world metropolis had. However, this
particular project encountered an enormous resistance which became, in a sense,
the symbol of rejection of the urban planification o
In conclusion we can say that the forces that planned the Paris region are of a
symbolic nature as much as they reflect objective needs. This realm can explain
why the study of the Paris region was rushed and restricted to a limited group of
officials instead of being studied by the regular competent agencies. This is what
motivated declarations such as the emphatic "Paris is our Rhur" or De Gaulle "Go
ahead" as a comment on Delouvriers' conclusions in the the preparatory report on
the Paris region. However, another element, of a political order, also help explain
the planning decisions of the S.D.A.U.. The Gaullists had always feared
that France, as a nation, might get caught between economically expan ding and
increasingly independant regions and the supra-national ensemble of the Common
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market, soon to be realized. It is quite significant that the authors of the S.D.A.U.
felt the necessity to deny in advance such an implication of the plan. " It should
be avoided to give a geopolitic dimension to choices that we, in fact, have
situated at a more restricted level (...) {such as} to orient the extension of the
Paris agglomeration (...) {in order} to 'meet' the Common Market." (6) In any case,
the urbanization strategy of the S.D.A.U. created an "etat de fait" that decided for
the future of France (without consulting its citizen ) which would remain a nation
unified under the leadership of Paris and the central governement. It is such a
system that the events of 1968 rejected. In fact De Gaulle himself had foreseen
the growing discontentment and was tried to deal with the explosive situation a
few months before he had to resign. A quote from a speech he gave in Lyon, in
March 1968, shows it and ,in fact, sums up very well the philosophy that had
guided his urban policy. " The multisecular effort of centralization which was for
a long time necessary for France to realize and maintain its unity (...) is not
obligatory today. On the contrary, it is the regional activities that appear as the
provider of the economic power of tomorrow." I would like in the next section
to discuss what is in, my opinion, the most significant and important aspect of
the plan; the paris region new towns.
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CHAPTER V
THE PARIS REGION NEW TOWNS POLICY.
Introduction.
The central scheme of the S.D.A.U. was the proposal for the creationof
eight new towns in the suburbs of Paris. Similarly to the rest of the plan, the
new towns proposal differed totallyfrom the P.A.D.O.G. proposal. Since the
orientation of the plan was to accomodate the growth within the region it was
necessary to implement the new towns as close to Paris as possible. The idea of
constructing the new towns at the proximity of the secondary towns of the region
was therefore not a valid one anymore. An additional argument, given against the
P.A.D.O.G. proposal, was that the nnew towns (now projected to accomodate a
population of 500,000 inhabitants each) would, in fact, compete rather than support
the old towns. The circular pattern of implementation was also rejected. It was
objected that this was an amorphous solution. The authors of the S.D.A.U. argued
that, on the contrary, the new towns should be implemented according specific
"lignes de force". It was then decided to implement the new towns according to
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two west- east parallel axes extending on each side of Paris. They were to be
structured by the new regional express metro system. The choice of the two axes
was not random. The parallel axes were seen as the prolongation, in the Paris
region,of the Seine development corridor. Each new town should be provided
with an "urban center" that would create the sense of a "real town in opposition
to the ,uniform succession of charactereless dormitory suburbs or the
desert of the "Grands ensembles"_ the apartment block cities that had flourished
in the suburbs since the Fifties. The creation, in each new town, of an urban
center of regional importance was also seen as an opportunity to provide the
social amenities and the jobs that were lacking in the suburbs - especially in the
poor working class suburbs of the east. It is contradictory, however, that at the
same time the construction of a huge office area in the "pole restructurateur " of
La Defense, coupled with the new town of Cergy-Pontoise, continued to be
carried out .with great intensity. In effect, these two centers 25 Kilometers apart
and connected by the R.E.R. and a new freeway (It was even programmed at one
point to install a super rapid aerial train that would shuttle between the two)
created a pole of attraction that precluded any chance of attraction of the
entreprises to the east - a region where they are reluctant to settle at the first
place.
e New urban centers
a Urban centers to be developed
within existing built-up area
\\N Areas of new town development
Existing built-up areas
Forests
010
TWO PARALLEL AXIS '1O BREAK THE RADIO CONCENTRIC DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PARIS REGION.
THE FIVE NEWTOWNS OF THE
A 'GRAND ENSEMBLE' IN THE
PARIS REGION
'DORMITORY SUBURBS'OF PARIS
C R t T E I L STOSKOPF ARCHITECTE
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The Social and Architectural Objectives of the New-Towns:
The First Phase.
The new-towns were designed to respond to the most urgent social problems
of the suburbs. The increasing commuting time due to the separation of the
residential and working area was probably the most general claim of the people
of the suburbs. It reduced relaxing time, family time and increased the
transportation budget and the workers impatience. It is not surprising, then, that
the main objective of the plan (and arguably its greater success) was the creation
of a direct rapid transit metro system, comfortable and cheap.
The main architectural (and also social) objective was to create a suburban
environment different of the "dormitory suburbs". As the construction minister put
it later (in 1973), the objective is to fight against the " (...) social segregation
that outcasted in suburbs without amenities, those who cannot 'pay' for an
existence in the center of a real town." (1) The newtowns will be thus provided
with the urban centers that the suburbs need. They will be centers of "regional
importance" serving a large area of suburbs around them as well as the
newtowns, of which they were expected to be the most 'urban' element. In fact,
all the strategy of the plan revolved around these centers. In turn, all the problem
of the newtowns turned around the question of "what constitute a true urban
center?" and how should one plan and implement it.
This question was treated in a rather different manner by the authors of the
S.D.A.U. ,in 1965, and by the Giscard administration from 1974 on. In between,
the events of May 1968 had happen. Their real influence must be seen on the
long run, where the ideas expressed violently during the summer penetrated
gradually all parts of the society, changing radically the behavior of individuals
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and institutions. The official planning institutions were not, by far, spared by
these structural changes. The change of urban policy was discussed in a number
of official brochures, annonced personnally by Giscard himself.
I shall discuss the way these changes have affected the way the question of
the new urban centers was tackled. It is important to realize, at the outset, that
the newtowns were constructed after 1968; so that, for the most part, they are a
reflection of the second period and not of the ideology that prevailed at the
moment of their inception. The change of approach of the administrators and the
architects is, however, manifest.
The 1965 approach to the question of the urban centers is essentially
pragmatic, quantitative and mechanistic - in short: Technocratic. The plan declares
that the urban center should create the sense of a "real town" as opposed to the
'succession of characterless dormitory suburbs' or the desert of the 'Grands
Ensembles'. The plan declares that if you can measure thesize of a city by the
number of its inhabitants you can measure its quality by the diversity and the
quality of the services the town offers in its center. Indeed, a urban center is "
(...) the part of- a town where the greatest part of the (service) jobs, commercial
space, administrations, schools, cultural and recreationnal facilities is
concentrated''2) The plan observes that there is, in Paris, a hierarchy of centers:
the 'heart' and the neighborhood centers ( which correspond to the type of centers
that Haussmann had plannned in the annexed areas ) : " In Paris, one of the first
agglomerations of the world, this phenomenon of specialization of the 'heart' in
the 'rare' functions of high quality is particularly developed (2) and grouped in the
10 arrondissements of the center. Famous stores, specialized shops, financial
institutions, large corporations, French and international administrations,
universities, business, recreationnal facilities, which in principle serve a population
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of 8 millions inhabitants and have often a larger influence of a national, european
or international order." (3) In the neighborhood center are located the type
services that accomodate the daily needs of a population of "(...) 10,000 to 30,000
inhabitants: elementary schools, sometime junior high school, several types of
retail, a post-office, a 'neighborhood' movie theater and the like." (3)
The problem of the Paris agglomeration, the plan argues, is that it does not
possess any intermediary type of center between the one accomodating 8 millions
inhabitants and the one accomodating 30,000 users. The suburbs need to be
provided with the type of center that serves a middle-sized town such as
Toulouse or Strasbourg. The plan notices the fact that "the Paris agglomeration
increases, every three years by the population of such a town.".
What are the possible solutions? The solution of a 'second Paris' is dismissed
on the grounds that " Although the idea is seductive (...) it cannot solve the
problems of Paris neither on the quantitative level (...) nor on the plan of the
functions: Which town, even new, could reach rapidly the level of seduction that
the heart of Paris offers? ".(4) This pragmatic analysis leads to a logic solution:
Because such a parallel center could not reach rapidly enough the level of
services of Paris; why not plan, at the outset, several centers of the intermediary
level in the suburbs?
At this point the analysis of the plan remains fairly consistent, although it
proceeds from a 'centralist' point of view. It never seeks to set up mechanisms
of development that would allow the municipalities to plan their own development
together within general guidelines and the possible arbitration of the state. It
plans, at the outset, to implement new centers rather than to help develop
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existing ones. It plans to concentrate services, facilities and infastructures when
there was probably a way to implement them in a more diffuse pattern without
necessarly losing a structure. Perhaps, the mega structure of the two parallell axis
of linear newtowns ( a strategy to break the radio-concentric development of
Paris) could have allowed a more decentralized articulation on the scale of the
newtowns: with the installation on the existing fabric of a series of smaller
centers specializing in each of the new functions needed. This would have allowed
for an easier integration on the fabric of smaller size centers, created a defined
area where the suburban region could get the services it needed, and, lastly,
would have revitalized the area itself.
However, it is in the programming of the new centers that the plan will really
fall short of studies. - One would think that these centers require extensive and
comprehensive studies , on a case by case basis, determine their programm in
relation to numerous and complex elements (local populations needs, site
conditions, etc ). To the technocrats, however, it was sufficient to apply a general
law that generated centers with identical features. They must be identical because
they are conceptualized by agencies located in central Paris as ideal programs.
The profile of the centers will be obtained by a simple calculation: to the
functions of Paris will be subtracted the 'rare' and the neighborhood functions. "
II The new urban centers will serve a population of 300,000 to 1 million of
inhabitants.(...) The amenities to group will be: - For educationnal purposes:
universities and specialised schools.
- For cultural purposes: The "Maisons de la Culture", a theatre,an auditorium,
a preview movie theater.
I
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- For sportive purposes: The olympic swimming pool, an important hotel, an high
-class restaurant.
- For administrative purposes: The prefecture or the sous-prefecture regrouping
a number of public services incorporated in a
administrative city.
An implicit hypothesis of the plan is that the objectives of the S.D.A.U. will be
achieved thanks to the Administration that will transfer the functions where and
when it is needed. However, the historic centers to which the plan refers are in
many instances in a very distinct position from the future urban centers of the
Paris region. Firstly, they are provincial capitals which serve a large rural region.
They have a monthly market that attracts and exchanges all the goods of the
region at least once a month. Most importantly, they are cities which had been
formed overtime, which have gained the functions and the fabric they have
through a very long historical process. Is it possible to obtain a center to
merely parachute similar functions
than the ones existing in a historic urban center?
Is it really possible to dissociate the central functions from there physicall
setting and the center from its hinterland at the first place? At all these
questions the plan responds, by default, positively. In my opinion this proceeds
from the same sort of confidence that the colonial architects and planners had
demonstrated. It must be said, right now, that the administration has well played
its role since almost all the amenities and facilities depending of the state have
been put in place. But the newtowns, in general, did not succeed in attracting the
lively activities depending on the private sector which are precisely what makes
for the quality of the urban centers. No one would find a high class (nor a second
class) restaurant in the new towns; one could desesperatly look for a hotel ( M.
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Mead has justly said that the difference between the suburbs and the city is that
the former does not welcomes the stranger. The newtowns are, under such
criteria, still suburban.). or other urban activities such as a club, a bar, a theater, a
movie theater and the like. There is the cultural center, the Agora which houses
some of these activities and the shopping mall has small shops but they are not
too convincing. The social activity there is identical to the one of any suburban
shopping mall and is equally restricted to its ownarea. The social activity does
not even reach the other parts of the urban center.
The higher scale public facilities were not implementedin the Paris new towns.
There is no stadium, a facility which would surely have animated the centers,
given the extreme popularity of soccer or rugby. This, in turn would have
provided the regular clientele for more private shops and recreationnal activities.
Similarly, the hospitals, which represents toolarge of an investissement for the
newtowns were not built.
Finally, the 'exceptionnal equipements' that were supposed to be decentralized
because of a lack of space in Paris are all housed in the capital. In fact, the
S.D.A.U. was relatively realistic ( but unconsistent ) about the the possibility of
decentralizing these exceptionnal facilities or even of creating autonomous urban
centers. " The heart of Paris will remain the center of all the agglomeration, of
all the urban region and several of the function that central Paris houses will
remain unique. (...) The Comedie Francaise, the central administration will remain in
Paris. For all these reasons, the urban centers will not be completely
autonomous." (5) In fact, there are a number of contradictions in the S.D.A.U.
which suggest that the plan is maybe trying to solve opposit objectives: 1- The
plan seeks to 'decongest' Paris and to develop the lagging regions, but
at the same time structures Paris and its region to become a region of high
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competitivity at the common market scale and Paris to be one of the
leading metropolisis of the world - perhaps the future capitale of the
Common Market ( although this last point is not mentionned in the plan ).
2- The plan seeks to favot the economic development of the East suburbs but
launches in the West two large interconnected projects, La Defense and Cergy
- Pontoise which will take care of the future demand for office space in the
Paris region.
3- The plan wants to develop a number of important facilities in the new urban
centers such as hotels, conference centers, auditoriums, theaters and the
like but keeps on developing such facilities in Paris Intra - Muros ( Le
Front de Seine, the 'World Trade Center' project in Les Halles, The Porte
Maillot international conference center and auditorium, the Centre
Beaubourg etc.
4- The plan seeks to elaborate lively environments in the new towns but is
elaborated within a restricted group and in the deepest secret ( to avoid
the speculation ), so that the municipalities , which are the existing life,
are not consulted.
5- The plan hopes that an identity will develop in the new communities but
designs them in relation to a development strategy designed for the
agglomeration where Paris has the central role.
6- The plan speaks of functions, not to serve people, but to attract people.
7- The plan does not speak of new towns, it speaks of Paris.
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The Events of May 1968 will seriously shake up the prevalant conceptions in
France and with it the state, the technocracy, the policy of centralization, and of
course the urban policy in France.
A very immediate impact is the reduction, in 1969, of the number of the Paris
new-towns from 8 to 5 and the decision to create 4 new towns in the province.
The D.A.T.A.R. ,( the official body in charge to administrate the decentralization to
the provinces), has finally seen its claim heard that the policy of the District de
la Region de Paris was developed in detriment of the Provinces.
Another immediate effect is that, with the resignation of De Gaulle the plan
loses its most powerful supporter. Very quickly, a number of measures ar e taken.
The first one is the 'nomination' of the principal instigator of the plan P.
Delouvrier to another position. The second one consists of limiting the
importance of the Parisian new towns. It was then difficult to stop the
operations already in operation engaged on the field since 1966. However, the
surface of the new towns is diminished as well as their number. The financial
charge of the state is also diminished.
But the most important outcome for the newtowns themselves is that the
development corporations are officially created (in 1969) and located on the site.
This point will really begin a second phase for the newtowns;their development
will become much more independant of the technocrats. Although someone could
argue that this evolution was bound to happen anyway in a second phase of
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implementation of the newtowns, I think that this movement had been amplified
by the shifts in the national political situation.
So, the planning of the newtowns became a more open process in which
a large number of differant specialists such as architects, planners, economists
but also sociologists, geographers, psychologists and also the local elected
officials participate. This multi - disciplinary team open the experience of the new
- towns to all the reseach and the discourses of the post 68 era.
In the process, the regional scheme of the plan,( namely the strategy of the
two paralell axis designed to 'break' the radio concentric development of Paris
began to lose its consistency: The suppression of the new town of Mantes had
suppressed a major link of the southern axis. The new town of Cergy Pontoise,
adopted a circular urban pattern, fitting in the site but contradictory to the linear
expension originally planned with the two axis.
THE CIRCULAR PATTERN OF THE NEW TOWN OF CERGY PONTOISE
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11 Shifts in the Conception of the New Towns Urban Centers.
2.1 The introduction of new conceptions.
The objective of the creation of urban centers fostering life in the suburbs
remain unchanged. However, there is no doubt that the conception of the centers
was enriched by the new multi disciplanary teams. One could argue that the shift
from the technocratic global approach was bound to happen when the urban
centers reached the level of the fine grain design. I would argue, however that the
more comprehensive approach had been multiplied by the events of May.
An official brochure published in 1972 gives the tone of the studies: " The
construction of urban centers can no longer be approached piecemeal by the
adding up of sundry public or private programs. (...) The public authorities have
already set about acquiring sites and giving them primary and even secondary
development; they will have to go further in the matter of urban centres." (6)
What will really change in the conception of the centers is that the planner
will not think in terms creating artificially the urban centers by the
deconcentration of the central functions but from the point of view of the
community that would live there. In other terms the Prefecture is not enough off
the guarantee to promote the success of the urban centers, but the quality of the
space experienced by the collectivity. It is not only a question of creating the
centers out of a receipe that had made its proof in the past,the civic square
model of the colonies but to achieve a mixture of spatial and programatic
requirements needed for a population which will have the latitude to settle or not
to settle in the newtowns. Without population, no urban centers and no newtowns.
In short, before constructing the center one should construct the conditions of
centrality.
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Many tactics were undetaken to rech this goal. From the realization of the
center as a copy of the spaces of the 18 century city to the evolutionnary
proposal of Le Vaudreuil to the envelopment strategy of the Etangs de Berre to
the incremental strategy of Cergy to the programatic and dense approach of
Evry.
However a conscensus resides on two major strategies: the interlocking of the
functions and the the flexibility of the center.
2.2 The interlocking of functions.
A major social goal of the newtowns is to avoid the social catastrophy of
the Grands-Ensembles". The housing superblocks projects were deficient in every
aspect. They did not provide the necessary services of the daily life,
for which the inhabitants had to depend on the closest community. The large
open spaces did not specifically induce people to gather together. At night,
they became too open to be safe. The grands ensembles were not furnishedwith
community services or social amenities. They really were a desert, a pitiful copy
of the Le Corbusier Unites d'Habitation. The technocrats, realizing these conditions
and the related increase of teenage violence ( for which the Grands Ensembles
became, at night, the action field ) decided to 'animate' these housing projects
with the aid of professionals: social councellors, educators, etc. Each of the
Grands Ensembles was then provided with a ' Maison de la Culture that was
supposed to provide the recreationnal and educationnal facilities for the
community and specifically, for the younger population. Thus, the technocrats
were, unconsciously, following the functionnal decoupage of the Charte d'Athenes.
This dichotomy was rather ridiculously translated in the physical form; the small
Maisons de la Culture juxtaposing the huge housing bocks. The Maisons de la
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Culture located in the Grands Ensembles were a total failure. In the best case
they became the refuge of gangs.
This experience was very fresh in the planners memory as they began to
design the urban centers. It was necessary to avoid another error. The experience
of the Agora of Dronten, in the Netherlands furnished a tempting model. This
experience of 'integrated collective amenities' located within the fabric and
providing to the community a central meeting place was a model that could be
replicated and even refined in the urban centers. The idea was essentially to
realize a fine tuning between the social amenities and the other activities of the
center. The planners were hoping to bring 'naturally' the collectivity to use the
cultural and recreationnal services around which it was hoped that that a local
identity and a real community would built themselves.
The decision was then to tie the shopping center with the Agora, which would
be then provided with a large number of customers:
It is true that the shopping function is a driving force
in the urban centers since it encourages a considerable
inflow of customers whose presence ensures animation and
provides a continuous pretext for events marginal or
external to shopping ( exhibitions, displays, fashion
shows). The shopping center can be regarded as an
anchorage point from which various development programs
can be envisaged. It can be affirmed that in deciding to
integrate the shopping centre in the urban centre, (...)
(the planners) have a good chance of achieving living unit
units and not caricatures of urban centers."(7)
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Thus, in the three newtowns of Cergy, Evry and Marne la Vallee , the poles of
facilities were placed at the crossroads of circuits originating in the major
functions existing in the centrer. In Evry, the urban center features a very similar
experimentation to the one of Dronten which is also named the Agora. The Evry
Agora which has a surface of 30,000 square meters lies at the meeting point of
three 'functionnal circuits', civic, cultural and recreationnal and commercial. In the
Agora a large place has been left for community information and communication
and its design (particularly its size) attempts to create the conditions of
communnal life, that is, of exchange and social interaction.
In fact, the same approach was to be extended at the center at large. A true
urban cente, the planners argued is characterized by the mixing and the
concentration of functions within a limited area. More precisely, the planners refer
to the Latin town, a town with a strong tradition of communal space and
municipal identity. Thus, " The segregative urban layout of the Chartre d'Athenes
has been rejected in favor of an interlocking of all urban functions present in the
center." ( Le Vaudreuil, " Principles of organization and town planning directives" )
(8). The principle adopted is that of interlocking the urban functions as opposed to
their juxtaposition. The characteristic of the centre is not its vertical, like with the
american business district, but that it is complex.
The complexity of the centre is guarantee for its animation. The shopping
centers draws a clientele to the recreational facilities, which should then develop.
As they develop they provide an extra'animation' of the center and a
supplementary reason for the people use it. The tactic is to make the functions
interact between themselves so that they create a movment which will make the
people interact among themselves: in a sense to create a chain reaction. The
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planners then only need to provide the " critical mass' of equipments. Thus,
housing will be above social facilities, offices and nurseries above the shopping
center, on the bus stations will be superposed the new Regional Express Railway
stations and a new type of urban tranport limited to the urban center reducing the
time distances between these points.
A priori the rationnal of the planners is consistent. It is sure thatthe
interlocking and the concentration of functions should create a more lively
environment than their dessimenation throughout a large space. For the French
planners the experience of the mixed use centers, the malls and the wharfs that
begin to multiply at that time in the United States are a good indication of the
potential of such a strategy. However, there is a difference. All the urban centers,
in order to cope with the technical complexity of accomodating many movement
systems in a limited space, will be integrated vertically in a solution that divides
with a pedestrian slab the office buildings and the housing above it and all the
infrastructure ( roads, trains,buses,shopping center, parking lot and the like )
underneath it. However this solution is not an unforseen consequence of the
interlocking of the urban functions. It is a reflected choice. The planners believe
that the separation of the flux ( pedestrian and vehicular ) is a good thing.
However, from this decision will result a series of consequences. Firstly,
although this was contrary to planners goal, they, in fact,recreate a spatial
dichotomy - a separation in the functions of the center.
Second, all the shopping activity will be underground ( in Evry and Marne ).
Although there is a zenhital lighting, the feeling will not be the same as shoingp
and strolling outside at the same time. People usually would rather be outside to
stroll.
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But most importantly, this division will dedensify the level of activity at the
level of the pedestrian slab. It will dedensify it in two ways. Firstly it will
dedensify the built environment, most of the structure and services of the centre
being underneath. It will restrict its level of use because a user that does
notneedto specifically go on the slab can very well switch of transportation
means ( metro to bus, metro to car ) and stay underneath. It will restrict the level
of use of the center, because one has to go throught all the business of parking
and walking to a certain point of the slab. Someone cannot drive through and
stop. Someone will not naturally walk in the center, one has to really badly want
to walk there and use a complex system of vertical and horizontal circulation.
But why should one go there at the first place? Because there is very little
commerce on the slab and the commercial center is underneath. ( Even in Cergy
where the commercial center is not separated underneath, the slab level is
commercially deserted.) Another problem is that commerce in general does not
appreciate the division of traffic. Traditionnally they settle at a traffic intersection
were they know that they will have a certain amount of clientele throughtraffic.
In any case the people themselves do not like to be separated from their
individual means of transportation, especially at night . Far all these reasons one
will not find the rich variety of private commerce that one would find in a
traditionnal center.
For an urban design point of view the problems of the separation of the
traffic deprives the environment of a number of urban features.
One is density. Because a part of the functions of the centers are located
underneath the pedestrian slab, and because very few, if any, private commerce
will settle at the slab level; the slab level is an environment of low density.
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The second is orientation . Because the architects do not have to respect a street
alignment the environment is very often informal.With a low density it often
becomes loose.
The third one is scale and hierarchy. Because there is no street pattern there is
no scale of the open space which gives the impression of a residual void
separating descrete pieces of ( good or bad ) architecture. Coupled with the
notion of scale is the notion of hierarchy. Because it is not surrounded by a
dense network of streets that give access to it the center on the slab does not
allow for the preparation, the sense of entering a space of a different hierachy.
This is a crucial experience that one has in any any Latin center (any italian
hilltown for instance). In fact one switches from the mechanical envirnoment of
underground to the large space of the slab. There is also no hierarchy of
buidings, evident in the latin center where the Town Hall is juxtaposed with the
residential fabric. In the newtown centers these buidings areso far apartthat one
cannot make these kind of associations ( as he would instantly do in a Latin
center ) that provide for the lisibility and the indentity /imagibility of the
environment There are no architectural elements to give some sens of scale and
bind
an environmemt together.
However some such late attempts were done . The connection of thecultural
center of Cergy with a little square defined by a continuous facade in a form of
a crescent is a limited but convincing urban sequence. Unfortunately it is borded
one one side by the void leading to the street level.
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It must be mentionned that this' particular study had been commended to an
English consultant group. Marne - la - Vallee urban center offers some extensive
efforts in this sense ( in the second part of the urban center) but they are quite a
failure: the problem is that the squares are empty, they are too large, there are
too many of them, they are not surrrounded by a street network which would
putthem in value. In addition, they house several extremely manierist and
egocentric buildings which are rather ridiculous. One can only deplore that such an
interesting experience at the origin ( the architects of the center had attempted to
design the 'architecture ofthe city' at first around which the buildings to be
constructed had to articulate themselves ) produces such unconvincing results.
2.3 Flexibility.
Flexibility is the most clear-cut choice that has been made
for the new urban centers. (...) We must certainly not
crystallize the future, but at the same time we cannot
leave it to itself. To 'design' the centre of a
Comprehensive Development Area of a few thousands
dwellings was still within the limits of possibility;
on the other hand to organize down to the slightest
detail the complex combinations which will develop in
ten or fifteen years is purely illusory. (9)
Although they did not have a satisfactory definition of an urban centre, apart
from knowing that " Centers are zones characterized by a very high arithmetical
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density and marked by a 'visual density' ",(10) there was a consensus on two
points.
The first was the 'interlocking' quality of the centers, and the second was the
necessity to allow for its transformation by the living socio-economic forces that
were supposed to exist at some point in the urban center.
However, between the necessity to give a structure to the future and the
opposite necessity to give to this structure enough flexibility to allow for future
transformation fell a number of solutions and existed a number of theoretical
positions : " It is therefore quite clear that the problems which arise relate to the
strategy of centrality and not of the existence or non existence of the urban
centre." (11). Another difference ( other than theoretical ) among the planners of
the new towns was that each newtown ( in Paris and in the Regions )
corresponded to a different economic, sociological and geographical environment
that called for particular approaches and strategies. These parameters should be
taken in consideration when one looks at the different strategies adopted.
Nevertheless there was (and there still is) clearly different theoretical positions.
Some planners questionned the validity of two assumptions adopted elsewhere;
that is one the geographical regrouping of all the functions as the starting point
to create a center, and second, the possibility of establishing all the spatial and
programatic frameworks of the center and still allowing for the inhabitants to
interact with them.
The most radical criticism of this kind came from the planners of Le Vaudreuil,
the province newtown located next to Rouen in the Seine corridor development.
" Is it deemed sufficient to reassemble georaphically
the elements of a traditionnal center (...) for the
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inhabitants to recognize the new center as such and
to adopt it?" ( le Vaudreuil) (12)
The second question of the planners of Le Vaudreuil was onthe notion of
flexibility. They favored the most open (to interaction ) type of urban r
structure possible which yet was a 'Germ' of urban center.
The strategy adopted was to design this 'Germ', a twin pole axis of 400
meters long. One pole housed the shopping center, the second a cultural
recreationnal center. A third pole along the same axis was the railway station and
corresponded to a next step of the towns development. The 'Germ' was
surrounded by a neutral grid of roads (Each grid unit corresponded at a square of
400 meters by side) and was suppose to allow for the maximum flexibility in the
future development of the town.
The planners of Le Vaudreuil devoted a number of articles in professionnal
periodicals explaining their strategy of centrality. They mainly declared that " The
problem of the center cannot be dissociated from the overall problemof the
coming into being and evolution of the new town as a whole."
The organization of the facilities was thought in relation to the germ. It was
composed of two levels - The level of multiple facilities which are the
complementary elements of the urban
fabric (schools, sports, daily shopping). This first level does nott
modify the neutrality of the fabric,
- The level of unique facilities within the ' germ ' (social centre, shopping centre
, grammar school) which could ' polarize ' the network, which should
have a centralizing effect.
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If the strategy adopted in the newtown of Le Vaudreuil represents an extreme
position there was a variety of alternatives proposed. The strategy adopted for
the newtown of Les Etangs de Berre is a solution halfway between the
adaptability of Le Vaudreuil (there was even some technical previsions to
transform easely what had been built) and a ' 'central' strategy like the ones of
Evry, Cergy and Marne - la - Vallee.
The planners of the Etang de Berre adopted a srategy of envelopment. The idea
was to install a series of specific poles ( shops, offices, higher education,
housing ) in the circumference of a zone of 200 hectares which will regroup
themselves by a centripetal development in the centre of the zone to form a
complex unit resulting from the interpenetration of these specific poles.
The planners of the Etangs de Berre were also critical of the 'central' approach
of the majority of the Parisian newtowns. " The regrouping in one center of all
the principal elements of the town and all the higher order facilities and functions
assumes that this concentration will give rise to animation and a sense of
centrality . This seems to us to be open to criticism from both the economic and
the technical point of view."(13)
III The new urban policy of Giscard
It is very clear that the second phase of the newtowns' development,
by introducing the sociological and collective dimensions of space as an explicit
objective of the urban center provoked the experimentation of very different
solutions. It would be very interesting to compare the respective merits of these
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solutions. Although the planners argue that the formation of an urban center takes
at least thirty years before some meaningful results can be enregistred, the first
ten years should provide the observer with some interesting indications. Because
such a study should involve an extensive collection of data on site it had not
been possible to undertake it in the framework of this thesis. If such a study
should be done, however, the reseachers should really take into account the fact
that these newtowns are all in a different stages of development because they
were not launched at the same time for one thing and because they were not
granted with the same financial means.
To conclude this chapter I will describe how the second phase of the
newtowns was inscribed in a new discourse on the environment by which the
Giscardians seeked to demarcate themselves from the Gaullists development
strategies.
The philosoph Henri Lefebvre and the Situationnists ( a political movment
that provided all the theoretical reflexion for the critics expressed during the
events of May 1968 ) had been talking at length since the mid sixties of the
collective quality of the urban space. Their central critic was geared against the "
Societe du Spectacle " , a society of consumption in which it seemed that all
the human interaction had to be mediated by the merchandise,
where the exchange between individuals were limited to the commercial
exchange.
Lefebvre was observing in his book " Le droit a la Ville " that:
The street does not permit the constitution of a group,
of a 'subject' but his populated with people in search
... of what ? - the merchandise. (...) the merchandise
transform the people themselves into a spectacle to other
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people. (...) The eminent use of the town - that is of
the streets, the squares, the buildings, the monuments-
it is the Fair." (14)
Ten years after, in 1975, the political class was also interested in the
collective dimensions of the urban space. Giscard , as soon as he was elected,
took a stand in favor of a dramatic revision of the urban development policies as
they had been conducted until then. This was traducted by a serie of very
symbolic gestures. One is the change of the name of the Ministry of Construction
( which connoted centralization and technocracy ) to Ministry of the Environment
and the 'Cadre de Vie' which suggested quality as opposed to quantity, ecology as
opposed to industrialisation, etc. A second measure was the abundon of the left
bank expressway, a very unpopular project among the Parisians,
seen as the expression of technocratic urbanism. A third measure was the
revision of the 'world trade center' project designed for the site of 'Les Halles'
by the A.P.U.R. , the Paris city official planning agency to favor a more
'ecological' project. Finally, Giscard officially 'recognised' the neighborhoods , the
uses and the ecologists associations.
In short the Giscardians rejected all the principles of the V republic:
Economism, productivism, functionalism and the technocracy. On the contrary,
they developed a new urban policy based on new principles:
- Rehabilitation of the meeting place (plaza, forums, ora,
malls, pedestrian street, etc ) and enhance such
espaces by visible devices.
- Struggle against the segregation and the
and the monofunctionnality as factors of isolation d
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and uniformity of the districts.
- Priority to the common means of transportation so t
that the urban space could be appropriated by the
population.
- Reactivation of 'urban images' that had-disappeared
such as folklore, fair, local color, etc.
- Revitalization of the local democracy.
Clearly, these objectives did not come from a genuine enthusiam of the
authorities for popular fairs, decentralization or local democracy. This overall
revision of the urban policy was geared to keep the central system in place even
at the cost of some concessions. But the strategy aimed at keeping the essential
prerogatives of the administration while giving the appearence of dramatic
changes. Giscard had shown before his election a populist image of himself
playing the accordeon to offset that he was the pure type of the technocrat which
was not, at that time, in favor of the public.
His city planning policy was based on the same tactics. He worked at giving
some motives of satisfaction to some associations,promoted a number of events,
of fairs in Paris but did not attempt to undertake a structural reform. This policy
of more or less symbolic concessions was necessary because many problems
were posed with insistance by increasingly vindicative and demanding groups at
different levels of the society, from the neighborhood to the region up to
nationally organised constituencies such as the'ecologists' which began to stand
as a third force between the left and the right. The problem posed by theses new
PAGE 11-1
groups to th central govrnement was that they escaped the traditonnal political
structures. They did not go through the trade unions to expose their claims,
some of them, like the 'ecologists' refused to embrass any political ideology
some of them , more radicalized, were adressing a multiplicity of grounds that
interested their specific neighborhoods refusing the traditionnal sectorial
negotiations. In short, these groups which had qualitative rather than quantitative
claims did not play the game according to the rules used until then. Giscard had
very well understood that and it is no coincidence that he had created a ministry
of the quality of life.
Since these groups had been more and more active and organized since 1968
and had , in fact, succeded to constantly enlarge their constituency the central
governement could not anymore believe in the possible fading away of these
movments. It was urgent to deal with them, to respond to these new requirements
to avoid the risk of another upheaval.
In the same time, the state by being active in their direction could possibly
weaken the most radical groups that advocated theories opposed to the central
administration. The revision of the project of Les Halles is very symptomatic of
the 'Environmentalist' policy of Giscard. The new image of les Halles was the one
of a classical garden offered to the populations of Paris. However , the new
project added, in reality, a very small quantity of 'green space' to the A.P.U.R.
project. If the project was apparently satisfying some of the claims of the
neighborhood's associations, the resident's associations had not been invited to
paticipate to the design of the new project.
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The official credo of the 'qualitative' did not imply, by any means the revision
of the ideology of economic productivism ( as some environmentalists advocated
it ) but rather to adapt it to the new social circumstances.
" It would be better to introduce in the decision -
mechanism the explicit objectives of ' quality of life'
and appreciate what should be sacrificed to the economic
growth to reach them, rather than to disrupt the economic
expansion." (15)
This quote is excerpted from the report issued by a 'brainstorm team'
organized at the demand of the minister of economic planning , on the theme; "
The Economic Growth and the Finality of Development" sums up fairly well the
objectives of the 'environmentalist' policy of Giscard.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
Introduction.
In this conclusion chapter I will try to synthetize the data and the concepts
discussed along this thesis around four main themes that, I think, should sum up
the structure of my resarch. These themes are:
Centrality and the
modern movement.
users participation.
tradition of governement. Technocratic planning and the
centrality and Urbanity in the suburbs? Decentralization and
Finally, in a last section I will make some general comments, not
necessaraly related to French urban planning, but which are inspired by this
research.
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CENTRALITY AND THE TRADITION OF GOVERNEMENT.
The tradition of centralization is such in Paris, that, for a Parisian, to live
among the monumental perspectives, among the multiple urban manifestati
manifestations of power is natural. But it is not so evident.
The urbanization of Paris is born from extremely precise historic conditions.
One is the tradition of municipal government in Europe. The second is the unique
relationship established overtime between Paris and the central governments of
France.
At first, France is integrated in the European phenomenon of the 'Communal
Revolution' which, in the Middle Ages liberates the cities from the oppression of
the feudal lords and creates a sharp distinction between the bourgeois of the
Cite,
a freeman, and the peasant - serf, almost a slave of the feudal noble.
This dichotomy creates a specific identity of the town which is not merely
urban ' but becomes a municipality administrated by its bourgeois patrons. This
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specific identity and administrative unity of the town is not replicated throughout
the world. It remains essentially a European phenomenon.
In Islam, for instance, there is not such a municipal conception of the city
because every man under Islamic law is equal, whether he is a peasant or an
urbanite. Thus, the Islamic city is, in fact, an agglomeration of institutions (
religious, military, universitary ) of merchants guildes and of ethnic groups that
are structured in self contained unities, maintaining their own territory, premices
and ,perhaps,are coordinating their efforts when a specific large infrastructure or
event must be accomodated. But, in Islam, there is traditionnally no authority to
supervise the city globaly. It is significant that one cannot walk through the city
using the smaller street system. These streets are limited for the exclusive use of
the neighborhood residents. The open space of the Islamic city is not considered
public, it is largerly a semi private space controlled by a specific population.
This explains why no project interesting the entire city ( except for the
colonial one ) ever cut open the continuum of the Islamic city which remained
medieval until the 20 century.
If we look at another pattern of urbanization, in the United States for instance,
we would remark that the cities are not as unified, as central, as with the
European city. American cities consist of the juxtaposition of groups with
established traditions which do not seek to melt in the communal identity but
on the contrary, express ( sometimes spatially ) their differences.
Although this analysis should be nuancated by the most recent developments
(like the explosion of the downtown business districts, the reappropriation of
central districts like SoHo in Manhattan, the commercial redevelopment of urban
infrastructures ) it is, in essence, valid. The impact of 'central' redevelopment
strategies like the ones of Moses or Rockefeller never was as important as their
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authors originally planned. The latter, for instance, never succeeded to
interconnect the Rockefeller Center by an underground system to all the projects
he had launched or initiated. Moses realized a series of large facilities in
New-York but did not succeded to implement an overall policy except for the
highways.
But the highways launched in reality an acentral urbanization by disseminating
the city neighborhoods in the large suburban territory with their ethnic solidarity
as a form of centrality.
It is not a coincidence that the questionning over the validity of the urban
center as a (still) relevant form of urban organization comes from Melvin Webber,
himself from such an environment in California.
Paris: A double organization.
These two types of urban organization are obviously foreign to urban
France and Paris. Not only medieval Paris is, in the wake of the ' Communal
Revolution ' being centrally reorganized under the authority of the Merchant's
Provost but it will be doubly reorganized by the presence of the king and the
administrative centralization of France. As we had seen it in chapter three this
movment begins with Saint Louis, the first absolute monarch, who splits in 1261
the administration of Paris between the merchants Provost for the local affairs
and the king's Provost for the state affairs. This trend is continued by Philippe le
Bel who centralised the national Administration over Paris, is reiterated by the
works of Francois I during the Renaissance to finally culminate with the Louis
kings during the 17 and 18 century.
An interest of the larger order than the city itself is being concentrated and
expressed in Paris. The forces that are shaping Paris are not the expression of a
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local community of inhabitants but also of an exterior realm, that does not
essentially relates the city but uses it to to correspond with similar exterior
entities. To the expression of communnal power and identity will be added the
rethoric of central governements and administration. The administration
specifically will insure the continuity, in time and space, of the public works that
could have otherwise remained pieacemeal interventions.
In order to measure the impact of these dual forces, I shall examine the case
of the structuration of the city image with the example of a large town where the
municipal power is the sole responsible.
I will take the case of the transformation of the piazza San Marco in Venice
at the time of the Renaissance.
The approach to city design of the Renaissance is in Venice, as everywhere in
Italy, strongly influenced by the discovery of the central perspective and is tied
up with the emergence of Humanism. It is guided by such technical and moral
principles that Serlio has proposed the model of the tragic scene a short while
before Jacopo Sansovino begins his work on the Piazza San Marco. Indeed, the
work of Sansovino will consist in transforming the medieval space of the piazza
into a rationalized space with scenographic qualities. The most striking aspect of
this project lies in my opinion in the power of the process. At the difference of
the urbanism of the middle ages that oprerated punctually on a number of
discrete buildings, the rational of the Renaissance will automatically induce, not
one project but a process of transformation , through a series of projects, of the
entire fabric. In the Renaissance, the object of urbanism is not to transform some
structures but to transform entirely a urban sequence.
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In Venice, the transformation of the piazza San Marco begins with a rather
usual command: Sansovino is asked to design a new building in place of the
Procurators appartment building - a decrepit structure, that costs important sums
to maintain, which is located in the south aisle of the piazza. However, this
simple study was to trigger the entire restructuration of the piazza and the
piazzetta. All the buildings surroundingthe two squares have been redesigned with
a similar arcitectural vocabulary,
the ex building of the procurators have been pushedin order to create a a
symetry of the square and liberate the vista to the Basilica. The Campanile has
been isolated from the adjoining buildings. In addition, a very sophisticated shaft
of space links the piazza to the governors palace.
It is interesting to note that with the rationnalization of the fabric comes the
need to rationnalize the type of functions to be performed in the new square.
Only 'rare' functions should be programmed in the new piazza, thus the creation
of the library of ancient Greek and Roman manuscripts and the removing of all
the shacks and stalls as well as the dubious hotels that do not anymore 'fit' in
what should be now called a 'center'.
But why did all these transformations happened in the first place? What are
the forces that made the society undertake such radical changes? As I indicated
before it seems that the answer lies in the new Humanistic vision of the world.
Panofsky draws the parallel between Science that transforms the chaotic variety
of natural phenomena to a cosmos of nature and the humanism that transforms
the chaotic variety of human records to a cosmos of culture. In a similar way , I
would argue that the Renaissance architects and their patrons ( all of them being
presumably humanists. ) are transforming the cahotic variety of social and
physicall spaces of the middle ages into a rationnalized space suitable to the
codified social interaction of the humanist personne. It is not coincidence that it
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is since the Renaissance that the lunatics are separated from the society. Foucault
heas developed this point in Madness and Civilisation where he describes how the
lunatics were sentaway in boats ( the ships of fools ) before the society could
provide separated institutions to accomodate them.
If the centrality of an environment is, as Lefebvre defines it, its capability to
foster the social interaction of the people using it; the humanist proposing a new
model of human personnality interacting in a 'rationnal' way is bound to define an
environment with a different kind of centrality.This particular environment is the
center.
This particular interaction of the municipal structure, the humanist ideal, and
the science of perspective will act on the very same way on the fabric of Paris.
In fact these effects will be multiplied by the double structure of the Parisian
governement altogether municipal and national. The difference will be in the scale
of the transformations. If the municipalities of the Renaissance seek to transform
their most meaningful urban sequences in 'centers' the Administration will seek to
transform the city at large into a 'center'. This is only made possible by the
permanence of the administration that insure the continuity of the projects over
time. The administration ( eg the catholic church in Rome ) of the Kings will
transform the continuum of Medieval Paris into a continuum of rationnalized and
scenographic space.
This is particularly clear when someone looks at the evolution of urban spaces
from the first royal squares designed under Henri IV which were descrete pieces
related to their surroundings and the system of public spaces designed to
organize the entire city that was relized under Louis XV and further emphasized
by Haussmann.
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This is this kind of centralized design and planning that makes Zevi
assert that:
" Instead of inventing spaces for human life, one began to
design containers to wrap it up. With the perspective it
is not architecture that dominates, but the containers.'(I)
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TECHNOCRATIC PLANNING AND THE MODERN URBANISM.
The French technocratic administration is always looking for 'containers'
for a rational, for a model to normalize its anthithesis; the uncontrolled urban
expansion.
For the administration the suburban model, par excellence, is the oderly layo ut
of the western suburbs of Paris designed by the kings. The anti-model is the
red-belt suburbs.
In order to tackle this growth the technocratic power, as we have seen it in
chapter 3, is looking at the propositions of the modern urbanism would it be
Hebrard and Prost or, later, Le Corbusier or Lods.
The technocratic power is loking for a kind of 'program' such as Foucault has
defined it:
A calculated and reflected prescription according to which
the institutions should be organized, the space designed
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and the behaviors regulated." (1) For Foucault there is a
concept of 'bio - power' or 'bio-technico-power' that consist to know how to
master, know, feed and controll life itself. The specific technologies of the 'bio
power' having gained their modern form in the classical age.
We have seen in chapter three how the technocratico - administrative realm
was looking for the appropriate 'program' to wrap up the suburbs or, to reuse the
terminology of Zevi the appropriate 'container'. We recall the propositions of
Guerard for a 'French Washington'. Ultimately, the French technocracy achieved to
design a program for the suburbs with the S.D.A.U..
The S.D.A.U. is not a clearly political program in the sense that it does not
propose a clear solution for future social life like Brasilia or like Howard with its
newtowns, Fourier with its Phalanstere or De Guise with its Familistere had
proposed before.
I would argue, however,that the S.D.A.U. is definitely inscribed in traditions of
political 'programs'. It has a very precise idea of its objectives and implications
for social life but due to its scale of study it does not show it too clearly,
defining only general directions.
But the S.D.A.U. follows a methodology and an analysis strikingly similar to
the ones advocated by Le Corbusier which is himself known to hold very specific
ideas on the type of life the modern man should live.
The town must be studied in the ensemble of its region of
influence. A plan of the region will replace the simple
municipal plan. The limit of the agglomeration will be
function of its radius of economic action." (2)
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It is striking to see the similarity of nature as the plan as described by Le
Corbusier and the actual S.D.A.U.. The authors of the S.D.A.U. seem to confirm
this similitude:
There was never a 'project newtowns': there was a Schema
Directeur (...) {the newtowns} came out as a global
reflexion on the Paris region ensemble." (3)
The hypothesis of the plan is that it can master the destiny of the entire
region beyond the particularism of the municipalities. In fact, the technocracy had
already adopted the principle of such a 'Grande Vision ' with the plan designed by
Prost in 1934 which consisted of constructing a system of large landscaped
motorways that linked Paris with the Atlantic coast but were cutting open the
suburbs in the process. The kind of program that the technocracy is looking for is
something which sounds modern, rational and global.
The program must be set up on rigorous analysis made by
specialists. It must have a number of stages in time and
space. It must reassemble in a fecund harmony, the natural
resources of the site, the topography of the ensemble, the
economic data, the sociological necessities and the
spiritual values." (4)
One could read this citation of Le Corbusier as a fairly good description of
what the S.D.A.U. is.
The topography of the ensemble and the natural resources of the site will be
'adequatly' utilized in placing the two parallel axis of urbanization in continuity to
the Seine river basin. The economic values are consecrated in the S.D.A.U. which
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aims to transform the region as an 'economic tool' and the sociological
necessities taken care of by the provision of urban centers. Moreover the plan
consecrate an important place to the circulation function which, according to Le
Corbusier must tie together the three other functions ( working , housing,
,recreationnal), it provides the region with extremely importrant tranportation
infrastructures such as expressways, a new regional metro system, etc.
In fact, it seems like the planners are trying to define the new scale and the
new image of the region by its circulation network which are structuring the mega
structure of the two parallel axis.
This type of image, of concept is very close to the theories of the american
urbanist Edward Bacon who develops the concept of 'movements systems' in his
book the'Design of Cities'
Yet the image of the region is derived from the series of
impressions produced by all these systems interacting with
one another (...) A great difference between the cities we
have studied so far and the city of today is the
application of mechanical power. " (5)
The 'movement systems' presented as 'generators of architectural form' are for
Bacon ( as well as for the authors of the S.D.A.U. ) the key element of a strategy
to revitalize the suburbs.
The proposal is to create strong articulated nuclei and
institutions carefully distributed (...) throughout the
residentiall fabric to establish powerful architectural
imagery and rythm which extands their influence into
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less articulate areas around them. This would generate
neighborhood identification, loyalty and pride, and serve
as links for identification with the city and the region." (6)
This quote of Bacon could very well describe the strategy of the 'urban
centers' that the S.D.A.U. planned to implement in the suburbs of Paris.
There is , however, a major difference. The S.D.A.U. does not create such
centers 'around beloved landmarks' as Bacon suggest it but creates itsnew urban
centers ex-nihilo around some public administration in the continuit continuity of
the model established by prost in Marocco.
In a colonial situation or in the suburbs of Paris, the administration is equally
uninterested in relating to the local environment. The administration has a program
and this program should work indepedently of the context in which this program
is inserted.
The administration reppropriates the ideas developed by the architects but only
the central idea tranposable in a program.
This makes all the difference between a valid strategy of revitalization as n as
developed by Bacon and a plan worked out by the administration. One might work
while the other is ruined at the outset.
The major shortcoming of the S.D.A.U. is that it attempts to revatilize the
suburbs but it ignores them.
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CENTRALITY AND URBANITY IN THE SUBURBS?
The suburbs do not need the planners' intervention to be provided with
centrality. They already have their own kind of centrality; that is the suburbs
have their own traditions, mutual aid, its collective 'animation' ( to reuse a
technocratic terminology). Only when the technocrats are imposing their image of
modernity do the suburbs stop being living environments.
Perhaps, the suburbs are not 'beautiful' environments because they lack the
classical image of urbanity, but its arguable wether they need such an image nor
whether, in fact they need to be redesigned in the image of modernity. They
have their own image which is a sort of continuum ( as the medieval city) - a
continuum that needs to be preserved.
However, the suburbs needed to be helped. They needed more jobs, more
economic activities ( but less polluting ones ) and more 'exceptionnal' facilities.
The suburbs continue to have these needs.
One possible strategy could have been to continue with the 'restructuration
noads' ( advocated as early as the P.A.D.O.G.) of which nine had been planned by
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the S.D.A.U., multiply them in existing centers of the suburbs ( possibly at a
smaller scale to allow for a better integration in the fabric ) and forget about the
urban centers of 'regional importance' of the new towns.
Would this general 'sprinkling' had been inefficient? I dont believe that a
successfull economic revitalization of the suburbs should necessarly go through a
strategy of centralization. In the case of multiple centers there is more flexibility
to adapt to the location choices of the market. The problem ofthe industrial park
of Marne la Vallee for instance is that it is ready to serve an industrial clientele
that does not want to settle there. One could argue that, in this way, no
corrective effort is made by the public authority to even the development of
entreprises between the East and the West. I believe that it is very hard to
totally reverse a multi secular development tendency by a great planning decision,
even if this development itself was originally due to such a decision (the Tuileries
castle and the Garden). In any circumstances if this re equlibrium between the
West and the East was judged necessary it was incoherent to plan the Defense
and Cergy in the West. those developments had not had been constructed at the
first place it would have been easier to redirect the economic expansion by
planning more centers in the East than in the West.
In terms of the transportation system ( and assuming that the majority of the
inhabitants of the suburbs will have to go working in Paris for a long time ) there
is no problem in keeping such a system which is very well realized realized.
Socially, it seems evident that the quality of the centers realized within the
suburbs would have been more successful if they had been of a smaller size and
their integration to the fabric studied.
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Finally, what about the necessity to break the radio-concentric development of
the region?
For one thing, the region has remained stable in size since 1965. That is it did
not expand out of the 1965 boundaries, which are defined by a circle of twenty
five kilometers radius.
In terms of the mega structure of the parallel axis, it seems no longer
appropriate to think in terms of those kinds of images but to recognize the
polynuclearity of the region as I suggested before and to work in this sense:
That is to build the jobs and amenities in the existing centers of the suburbs.
Such a strategy should seek to create specialized centers that could interact
economically with each other and then expand from this interaction.
In the case that those centers were to expand economically, it would, at term,
reduce the problem of commutation to work by installing transversal patterns of
commuting between suburbian centers ( as well as on site jobs ) instead of most
trips going to Paris.
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DECENTRALIZATION AND USERS PARTICIPATION.
Decentralization has been officially adopted in France as the law proposed
by the socialist government has been voted in 1983. The socialist government
itself, has been elected on a political platform favoring the decentralization, the
'auto-gestion', the regional auto-determination, etc.
In fact, these themes had been central to the socialist party campain for
several years already. One of the main electoral arguments of the Socialistes was
that, in fact, the right would never embark into such reforms because their power
was built on the centralist structure of the state administration.
Although the Socialistes have kept their alectoral commitments, that is that
they have effectively decentralized the planning competences at the level of the
mayors, there is still a major problem: the competences are decentralized but not
the budget which remains under the authority of the Departemental planning
agencies, that is under the control of the central administration. The department
planning agencies only have an 'advisory' role in the elaboration of local planning
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documents but since they control the funds they obviously are exerting a major
influence on the municipalities decision.
This situation clearly express the difficulty to achieve the decentralization in
France, even if the elected government is truly commited to this objective.
In fact, the partial tentatives of the previous governements had all been
unsuccessful. The nomination of the region prefects that were suppose to realize
the administrative unity of the regions (as opposed to the departements ) had
been totally ruined by the resistance of the departemental prefects.
The tentatives to liberate the state from the totality of the burden of the
urban development by installing patnerships together with the private sector, the
local municipalities ( The Societe d'Economie Mixte ) is a form of
decentralization. However, the state remained over represented in these
patnerships by the department planning responsibles, the technocrat representing
the central administrations (Ministry of Equipement, of Education ,etc...) and finally
the repesentants of the para public financing institutions themselves largerly
controlled by the state. A second problem that came up with some of the S.E.M.
was some unethical practices tying some officials with the private interests.
The users' associations had been 'recognised' by the Giscard government which
largerly advertised through the media his orientation towards an 'associative'
policy. This 'new policy' consisted in fact of a symbolical political manoeuvre
rather than of an actual decentralization.
Larry Susskind, observing the European user's movement situation, defines
three patterns of action of these groups: Paternalism, Conflict and Coproduction.
In France the situation is characterized by the Conflictual pattern ( the Giscardian
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policy being a tentative to shift to the Paternalist pattern) that is conflicts
between the users and the state ( the important user movement that lead to a
subsidization through payroll taxes of the transportation coasts for the Paris
region is a good exemple of that kind of conflict ) but also conflicts between
elected officials and the central administration as well as all the conflicts of a
clearer political order.
Such a domination of the state over all aspects of public life, all over the
country is now clearly unaccepted by increasing segments of the population. The
events of May 1968, but perhaps more significantly, the constant development of
associations, since then, clearly shows that such a situation cannot possibly last
too long. Due to the fact that these associations are generally rather politicised,
the shift to a paternalist pattern appears improbable. What is clearly wanted is a
'real' decentralization.
The decentralization would be successfull only if the different forces in
presence agreed to enter a mode of Coproduction. However the manifest
reluctance of the Administration to give up any part of its prerogatives in one
hand and the somewhat theoretical radicalism of certain users groups in the other
hand could very well perpetuate a conflictual situation.
It is really difficult to change the centralized structure of France which is
so much a part of the country that no one can really imagine what would happen
to the country if it suddenly shifted to a decentralized pattern. I believe that the
apprenticeship of the French society to a mode of Coproduction will be a long
and delicate process. It is probaly necessary that this process should be mediated
by the central governement as it does it now by splitting the powers between the
departmental and local s authorities. The question is to know wether the
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government will be likely to gradually withdraw itself from all its command
positions.
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COMMENTS.
This study leaves many unanswered questions. This seems unevitable due to
the nature of the topic which has so many ramifications, connections and by
definition is difficult to fit completely in a rational model.
Moreover it sems contradictory to me to argue against the shortcomings of
the Cartesian rationality in urban planning and, at the sams time, to pretend to
construct a rational model of explanation.
Finally, it is always difficult to objectively analyze a situation in which you
are yourself included.
However, I hope that this thesis has underlined some useful connections that
will help the reader to understand the central nature of French planning and
will suggest some further path of research.
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In the more limited scope of planning and architecture, I have tried to look (
through the example of Paris ) at the issues of center and centrality, urbanity and
appropriation.
These questions are important for the planning and architectural professions. I
would argue that these professionals, before they embark on designing and
planning projects, should reflect on the 'structure' of the environment on which
they are going to operate. It seems to me far more important that form be seen
in these terms than the terms of much of the professionnal debate today.
How should these professionnals undertake this necessary reflection? A very
interesting proposal has been developed by Donald Schon in his book " The
Reflective Practicionner " where he demonstrates that the good professional his
someone that lets his client ( the project, the situation ) he or she is working for
talk back " to him. For Schon the most creative part of the professional
happens at this moment when the professional 'interacts' with the situation. It is
during this period that the professionnal adjust his specific skills to the given
assignement. This kind of reflective practice ,Schons argues, goes beyond the
postivist ideology of 'Technical Rationality' where the professional assume that its
specific skills will be able to solve any situation , to, in fact, recognize that the
complexity of every situation cannot be tackled through the set of professionnal
skills. The reflective practicionner bridges the gap between its skills and the
situation by putting himself in a 'conversationnal mood' with the situation.
This type of reflection is, by essence, difficult to teach because it is a very
unique and individual experience floating between intuition, observation and
pragmatism.
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Coming back to the archictectural and planning fields I would say that the
quality of an urban sequence such as the place Dauphine should be understood by
its morphological qualities ( a V shaped space ) its spatial relation with the Pont
Neuf and the kind of centrality that the ensemble produces rather than in terms of
detailed stylistic expression of the buildings that surrounds the space.
Wether it is a royal square or the suburbs of Paris it is necessary first of all
to understand the structure of the environment so that an architect or a planner
can apporpriately intervene in the environment. Thinking in terms of structure
rather than reference, centrality at large rather than centers, would be a reflecting
method that would avoid the kind of errors produced under the realm of technical
rationnality that on can sense in places such as the governement center in Boston.
Reflection on that level would allow the professional to deal successfully with
a multiplicity of uniquely complex situations. Each environment has a particular
structure which produces a specific centrality, that is the specific centrality of the
environment, this 'deep structure' of the environment which gives it its genuine
quality and identity, should be discovered and enhanced by the professional
working on his or her project.
Thus, a western consultant working in the 'urban villages' that are developing
around the third world capitals would discover that the centrality of these
environments is related to the rural social structure of their inhabitants and would
try to rethink his standards of urban centers in terms of density, plot structure,
etc, and revise its quality standards in termsof housing and infrastructure, in
relation to the population income.
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If the same consultant had to work on a project of revitalization of the
Medieval city of Cairo he would have to recognise the labyrintical quality of this
environment, its multipolarisation and avoid to break it by introducing the modern
traffic in the fabric. On the contrary, the consultant should seek to preserve and
integrate these multiple centers in its revitalization strategy.
If someone had to redesign the river front of Baghdad or the waterfront of
Chicago, he should be equally cautious to avoid a development along the
waterfront that would cut open the tangential flux which are connecting the fabric
to the waterfront.
Such a method would be helpful to set up a number of priorities of what
should be achieved in a situation where the credits are limited. The approach of
revitalization on a plot by plot basis which was taken in Angouleme cannot be
afforded in many cases. In addition it restricts the changes that can happen in the
town by 'freezing' it in a image. A reflection on the centrality of the environment
would allow to selectively intervene on what should be changed to revitalize
without destroying the fabric. A reflection of this sort would allow the
professional to escape from the false debate between modernity and historicity
by trying to come to grips with the essential qualities of the urban fabric.
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